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ABSTRACT 
 
Empirical Study on the Korean Treasury Auction 
Focusing on the Revenue Comparison 
in Multiple versus Single Price Auction. (December 2004) 
Boo-Sung Kang, B.A., Seoul National University; 
M.A., Seoul National University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Steven Puller 
 
         This dissertation pursues to find an answer empirically to the question of the 
revenue ranking between the multiple price auction and the single price auction. I also 
attempt to get empirical clues in terms of the efficiency ranking between the two. 
Under the assumptions of symmetric bidders and private independent value (PIV), I 
derive the optimal bidding conditions for both auction formats. Following the 
structural model estimation approach, I estimate the underlying distribution of market 
clearing price using the nonparametric resampling strategy and recover the bidders’ 
unknown true valuations corresponding to each observed bid point. With these 
estimated valuations of the bidders, I calculate what the upper bound of the revenue 
would have been under the Vickery auction to perform the counterfactual revenue 
comparison with the actual revenue. I find that, ex-post, the multiple price auction 
yields more revenue to the Korean Treasury than the alternative. I also investigate the 
efficiency ranking by comparing the number of bids switched and the amount of 
surplus change which would occur when the bidders are assumed to report their true 
 iv
valuations as their bids. I find that the multiple price auction is also superior to the 
alternative in efficiency which supports the current theoretical prediction. Finally, I 
investigate the robustness of my model and empirical results by relaxing the previous 
assumptions. I, first, extend the model and estimation to the case of asymmetric 
bidders where the bidders are divided into two groups based on their size. It shows that 
the model and estimation framework are still valid and that the empirical findings are 
very similar to the symmetric case. I also test for the presence of common value (CV) 
component in the bidders’ valuation function. I propose the simple regression model 
adopting the idea of the policy experimental approach. I obtain quite an inconclusive 
result in general but find some evidence supporting PIV for relatively higher bid prices 
while supporting CV for lower bid prices.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
         Until the economic crisis that broke out in 1997 and the resulting slowdown in 
economic activities, the fiscal condition in Korea had been maintained fairly healthy 
under the operating principle of balanced budget. However, following the crisis, the 
government’s fiscal condition took a dramatic downturn with sharp increases in budget 
deficits projected to last for many years. The volume of Treasury Bonds (TB) being 
issued was significantly increased to finance the budget deficit.  
 
 
      1) 40 trillion Korean Won(KW) is approximately 33 billion US $(exchage rate 1US$=1,200KW)  
FIGURE 1. Domestic TB Outstanding & GDP Ratio 
 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the American Economic Review. 
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         Figure 1 shows the increase of TB outstanding and its ratio to GDP. 
Consequently with a dramatic increase in TB issuance, it became a crucial concern of 
the Korean government to raise the required level of funding in a cost effective 
manner. In order to reduce the funding cost, which also means maximization of 
revenue given a cost level, the Korean government has been implementing for the 
various policy improvements and institutional changes. One policy instrument is the 
market design of auctioning TB. In August 2000, the Korean government decided to 
alter the auction mechanism from the multiple price auction (discriminatory or “pay-
as-bid” auction) to the single price auction (uniform price auction).  
         Figure 2 depicts the difference in the payment rules for the two auction formats. 
In the multiple price auction, Treasury acts as the perfectly discriminating monopolist 
by awarding the security to the highest competitive bidder and working down through 
the competitive bids until the entire amount is sold, which is similar to first degree 
price discrimination of monopolist. In this auction bidders may submit multiple price-
quantity pairs as their bids, which trace out bid functions on the price-quantity plane. 
Treasury aggregates individual bid functions and finds where the aggregate bid 
function meets supply. The winning bidders pay the price bid for each unit. On the 
other hand, in the single price auction winning bids are determined in the same manner 
as in the multiple price auction, but every winning bidder pays the same price equal to 
the lowest winning bid (or market clearing price) rather than their bid price.  
         In making this conversion the Korean government might follow the conventional 
belief that under the single price auction revenue can increase by inducing more active 
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or aggressive participation by the potential bidders.   
 
 
FIGURE 2. Pricing Rules of Two Different Auctions 
 
         The basis of this argument is the following: bidders will attempt to maximize 
their profit from the auction, which can be defined as the difference between the 
true(or marginal) value of the security and the actual bid, by shading down their bids in 
the auction relative to their assessment of the true value of the security. In the multiple 
price auction winning bidders have to pay their bids, the incentive for bid-shading 
tends to be larger than in the single price auction. This reasoning basically follows the 
standpoints of conventional theoretical view which was suggested by earlier 
researchers such as Milton Friedman (1960). 
         However, many earlier researchers tended to consider that the two mechanisms 
used in Treasury auction were analogies corresponding to 1st price auction and 2nd 
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price auction in the single item auction respectively. Therefore they argued that single 
price auction could yield more revenue and more efficient outcomes than multiple 
price auction like 2nd price auction could do. 1   
         This incorrect conjecture resulted from not considering the distinctive 
characteristics of the multi-unit auction. Treasury auction is a multi-unit or divisible 
good auction where bidders have demand for multiple units of the good. Bidders 
submit their bid function in the form of a demand schedule, and they can choose both a 
bid price and a demanded quantity at that price. Hence the quantity is also a choice 
variable and we have to consider the possibility that each bidder’s quantity choices can 
affect the determination of the market clearing price. Therefore, the results of the 
single item auction cannot be applied to multi unit auction, and furthermore, when 
considering the common value, theoretical comparison becomes even more 
complicated and difficult.  
                                                 
         1 There are four common auction techniques to sell a single item, i.e., the first-price auction, the 
Dutch auction, the second-price auction, and the English auction The English (ascending, open, oral) 
auction is conducted by an auctioneer who calls successively higher prices until only one willing bidder 
remains, and the object is given to him at the last price which is called by auctioneer. The 
Dutch(descending) auction, which has been used to sell flowers for export in Holland, is conducted by 
an auctioneer who initially calls for a very high price and then continuously lowers the prices until some 
bidder stops the auction and claims the flowers for that price. The first-price auction is a sealed-bid 
auction in which the buyer making the highest bid claims the object and pays the amount he has bid. The 
second-price auction is a sealed-bid auction in which the buyer making the highest bid claims the object, 
but pays only the amount of the second highest bid.    
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         Recently, the incorrect attempt to connect the single item auction and the multi 
unit auction described above has been criticized and the fallacy can be summarized by 
the following statement.  
 
Most public debate about the relative merits of these two alternatives has been  
confused by an imperfect analogy between single unit and multi unit 
auctions……They incorrectly posit that uniform auction inherits the same 
attractive truth-telling and efficiency attributes as 2nd price auction and infer 
that uniform auction generate greater expected seller revenue. 2 
 
         Existing theory does not provide expected revenue ranking predictions for multi-
unit auctions, and seems to conclude that the revenue ordering in the multiple unit 
auction is generally ambiguous between the multiple price and single price auction.  
         To increase understanding, I will explain the possible trade-off between the 
revenue from the two auction mechanisms graphically. That is, the revenue trade off 
depends on the amount of bid-shading each bidder decides to undertake. To explain 
this trade off, I will use the individual bid function and residual supply function for one 
particular bidder which can be calculated by subtracting the aggregate bid function of 
all other bidders from the total supply. The market clearing price is at the point where 
individual bid function intersects the residual supply function. 
         In Figure 3, in the multiple price auction, the bidder pays the area of OAEMC, 
while in the single price auction the bidder pays the rectangle of OBESD so that the 
revenues from both auctions can be ranked by comparing the size of OAEMC and 
                                                 
         2 See Ausubel & Crampton(2002) 
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OBESD. In a rough sense, the auctioneer’s revenue in single price auction is more 
sensitive to the marginal units, whereas it is more affected by infra marginal units in 
multiple price auction. 
 
 
 
 
                       A 
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                                                    EM  
        
 
 
 
                        O                      C D 
   
FIGURE 3. Revenue Comparison in Individual Bidder Level 
 
         Note that I depict the actual bid functions under both auction formats lying below 
the true valuation line, which means the bidder shades his bid in both cases. In addition, 
I draw the bid function of the single price auction to be steeper than that of multiple 
price auction considering the possibility that a different type of bid reduction may 
appear according to the auction format. The most of recent literature predicts that in 
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the single price auction, the bidder has more incentive to lower the market clearing 
price due to its pricing rule than in the multiple price auction.3 In general, we cannot 
tell which auction format will yield more revenue before comparing the areas of the 
revenues, which, in turn, depend on bidders’ shading behavior and the location of the 
market clearing price. The amount by which a bidder shades his bid relative to his 
valuation depends on where he believes the market clearing price, or the residual 
supply function will lie. Observe that in this graph, if residual supply is larger than q*, 
then the revenue comparison is in vain because the multiple price auction always 
yields more revenue. 
Therefore, we need a different model to analyze the multi-unit auction such as the 
Treasury auction from that to analyze single item auction case. To my knowledge a 
complete theoretical model for the multiple unit good auction has not been developed 
and so it is an open question as to what the optimal auction scheme is.  
         Separate from the efforts to make theoretical predictions, there have been also 
many attempts of empirical approaches to compare the revenues using actual auction 
data. 
         The empirical studies on this matter have proceeded in two different ways. One is 
“policy experiments” and the other is “structural model approach”. In “policy 
experiments”, researchers choose a kind of base price4 which is thought to reflect the 
                                                 
         3 However, since in the multi-unit auction many equilibria may exist, and the steeper bidding 
strategy may be one of the equilibria, we cannot conclude this is always the case.  
         4 Usually when-issued market rates or resale market rates are used as the base price. When-issued 
trading occurs during the period between the auction announcement date and the actual issue date of 
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true value of Treasury bond to be auctioned and get the differential5 between the 
auction price and this value. This differential indicates how much different the auction 
price is from its true value so that if this gap gets larger then economic rents to the 
Treasury are smaller. Next, they regress the differential on the dummy variable 
representing the change in auction mechanism and some control variables. If the 
coefficient of this dummy variable is significant then the mechanism change has an 
effect on the government revenue. 
         On the other hand, “structural model approach” estimates the components in the 
equilibrium condition which is derived from solving a certain theoretical model 
directly. The common feature of the structural model approach is that while ones 
primary interests are the parameters that characterize the distribution of TB valuations 
one can observe only bids that are related to but not identical to these latent variables. 
In this circumstance, if a researcher knows a structural model that defines a mapping 
between these valuations and observed bids, and relies on the hypothesis that the 
observed bids are equilibrium bids, then he can estimate the distribution of valuations 
using observed bid data. 
                                                                                                                                             
security. Prior to the Treasury’s scheduled auction date for a given security, dealers and investors may 
either take long positions or short positions in the Treasury security to be auctioned. When-issued 
market performs various functions. First of all, the trading in this market gives potential bidders the 
demand for the security to be auctioned and generates more information about the depth and the 
diversity of the participants i.e. price discovery role. Secondly, this market also provides price and 
quantity insurance. 
         5 The differential is “auction spread” which is defined as rA- rs ( rA  : weighted average yield of 
winning bids, rs  : yield in when-issued market). If this spread is positive then we conclude that the 
revenue of auction is small.   
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         In case of single unit auction with private independent value paradigm, the 
structural model is simply given by this relationship. 
bi = s(vi, F) 
where vi : private value of bidder i, F(.) : the distribution of vi, 
s(.) : optimal strategy function, bi : bid of bidder i 
         Since private values are unobserved and random, bids are naturally random with 
a certain type of distribution, say G(.), that is determined by the structural elements of 
the model. The equilibrium bid distribution, G(.) depends on the underlying 
distribution F(.) in two ways: (i) through the unobservable vi, which is drawn from 
F(.), and (ii) through the equilibrium strategy, which is characterized by the function 
s(.).  If the structural model is identified, which means that F(.) can be determined 
from observed bids by imposing some theoretical restrictions on G(.), and that s(.) is 
invertible, then we can recover vi and F(.) by estimates of G(.) using only observed 
bids.  
         This logic can also be applied to the auction for the multi-unit goods such as TB 
auction. In TB auction, one usually estimates the distribution of market clearing price 
and recovers the implied true value. 
         Both approaches have their own merits and shortcomings. In case of the “policy 
experiment approach”, it is closer to the ideal experiment one would like to see and its 
procedure has easily understandable intuition. In addition, from the practical view 
point, it can be applied to the case in which the aggregate data are only available. 
However, it heavily relies on the assumption that bidder’s true valuations for the 
securities are accurately reflected in resale markets. Thus if the researcher cannot 
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control for factors that may have changed between the close of the auction and the start 
of trade in the resale market, the results may lead to incorrect conclusions. Also, it 
cannot analyze the distributional aspects of policy change when using the individual 
bid data. Practically this method cannot be applied to countries which do not have the 
experience of using both auction formats. In contrast, the “structural model approach” 
is specifying a full model of bidding so that it can measure richer implications about 
the strategic behaviors at an individual bidder level and the distributional aspects of the 
auction game. However, because it heavily relies on the theoretical model, the results 
depend critically upon theoretical assumptions.   
         In this paper I will attempt to compare the revenue ranking empirically between 
the two auction mechanisms in selling TB with the Korean auction data. Considering 
that the TB is basically multi unit good, I will try to set up a more appropriate model to 
capture this aspect. As the empirical method, I will demonstrate how to apply the 
structural model approach to this case, and how to use non parametric approaches to 
estimate relevant unknown parameters. 
         This dissertation is organized as follows: in CHAPTER II, I review the previous 
literatures on both theoretical and empirical side. In CHAPTER III, I summarize the 
rules and institutional details of the Korean Treasury auction and describe my data set. 
CHAPTER IV sets up the theoretical model required to perform the structural model 
estimation with the discussions about the relevant assumptions. In CHAPTER V, I 
discuss the estimation method in detail which I use. CHAPTER VI presents the 
empirical findings for both multiple price auction period and single price auction 
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period, and attempts to evaluate which auction format is superior in terms of the 
revenue and efficiency. CHAPTER VII deals with the robustness of my model and 
empirical framework when I relax some of the previous assumptions. I extend my 
analysis to asymmetric bidders’ case and present the empirical findings under 
asymmetries. Then, I attempt to test whether the common value component exists in 
the underlying value structure of bidder. Finally CHAPTER VIII provides concluding 
remarks. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Theoretical Literatures 
 
         In the study of the auction for a single indivisible item the well known “Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem” has been established by Vickery (1961). That is, if the risk 
neutral bidders adopt strategies which constitute a non cooperative equilibrium in the 
PIV paradigm, then the expected selling price is the same for all four mechanisms.6  
After this many researchers have tried to suggest the revenue ranking under more 
general circumstances and found that when one or some of the above assumptions are 
relaxed, particular auction forms emerge as being superior.7  
         However, this famous theorem does not hold in divisible or multi-unit auctions as 
in the case of the Treasury auction even under same conditions as the case of single 
                                                 
         6 Because on average the sale will be at the lowest price at which supply equals demand and the 
expected revenue generated for the seller by the mechanism is precisely the expected value of the object 
to the second highest evaluator for all four mechanisms. 
         7 For the risk-averse bidders, Holt (1980) show that the seller will strictly prefer the Dutch or first-
price auction to the English or second-price. Milgrom and Weber(1982) generalizes the assumption on 
the valuation structure in which both PIV and CV components are involved, so called “correlated value 
or affiliated value”, and shows that when bidders are risk neutral, the four common single auction 
mechanisms can be ranked as the English auction, the second-price auction, and the Dutch which yields 
same revenue as the first-price auction. 
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unit auction. Furthermore, when the assumptions are relaxed, theoretical comparison 
becomes more complicated and difficult.  
         The first attempt to set the theoretical model for multi-unit auction is found in 
Smith(1966). 8  He modeled the case that both bid price and quantity are choice 
variables with the assumption that each bidder associate a subject probability with each 
possible value for the minimum successful bid, and using the numerical example, he 
showed single price auction may yield more revenue than multiple price auction. 
Although he was the first researcher to recognize the unique characteristic of multi-unit 
auction explicitly, he made the problem similar to the single unit auction model by 
assuming that the bidder can bid for only one unit or can submit only one price. Harris 
and Raviv(1981) tried to generalize Smith’s model by allowing the change in bidder’s 
risk averse but maintained the same assumption of bidding for one unit only as 
Smith’s. They argue that the revenue equivalence between the two auction formats 
holds if bidders are risk neutral, but multiple price auction yields more revenue if 
bidders are risk averse.    
         The problem of “single bid”(or unit demand) assumption was criticized first by 
Scott and Wolf(1979). They showed that multiple bids are optimal under the multiple 
                                                 
         8 The earlier comments on the Treasury Auction were given by Friedman, D. Carson and A. 
Brimmer in early 60s. Friedman and Carson have independently suggested that the Treasury should 
abandon the policy of price discrimination in weekly treasury auction bills and substitute a simulated 
purely competitive auction in which all bids are filled at a uniform market clearing price. Brimmer, 
however, challenged this view, arguing in favor of price discrimination on the ground that efficient 
“…resource allocation should be subordinated to the minimization of interest cost to the Treasury…”. 
See Smith (1966) 
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price auction so that a single bid assumption was not an appropriate assumption in the 
multi-unit auction. However, in setting the expected profit function they did not reflect 
the possibility that strategic interactions of bidders may affect the market clearing price 
so that bidders are assumed to be a price taker. Nautz(1995) also worked with multiple 
bids but still with a price taker’s assumption. However, his contribution is that he 
analyzed a more realistic case, i.e., the discrete space of bids instead of the continuous 
choice sets. Though the optimal condition which he derived for single price auction 
was imperfect due to the price taker’s assumption, his basic setting for analyzing the 
discrete case will be adopted when I set up my own theoretical model. 
         The literatures which have been reviewed up to now have limits to fully deal with 
the characteristics of multi-unit auction because they assumed either that bidder can 
submit only one bid or that bidders are price takers. Therefore their suggestion is also 
very similar to the result from the study of a single item auction, which is that the 
multiple price auction and the single price auction could be viewed as multi-unit 
extension of 1st price auction and 2nd price auction in single item auction case. 
Consequently, they provide that in the multiple price auction all bidders would shade 
their bids by the same amount regardless of whether they possess very different 
degrees of market power and that in the single price auction bidders tend to submit 
their true value as their bids. 
        The explicit consideration for these important properties overlooked by earlier 
researchers was taken by Wilson(1979). He considered the downward sloping bid 
functions and more importantly, bidders’ strategic behavior by introducing the concept 
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of the “residual supply”. First, he assumes that each bidder i has been able to obtain the 
information about the value that is summarized in an estimate or statistics si. For a 
bidder participating in a share auction, a strategy is described by a function x(p;si) of 
both the price p and his information si. Under symmetric equilibria, an optimal strategy 
can be characterized in the following way. If each one other than bidder i is using the 
strategy x, then when i uses a strategy y the sale price p* will be that price for which  
Σj x(p*;sj) + y(p*;si)=1 
Note that the bidders must consider the fact that one can bid for only the residual 
supply which is defined by total supply minus other’s demand and the possibility that 
they can affect p* by choosing a different bid schedule.  
         Recognizing the strategic behaviors through the concept of the residual supply 
and using some numerical examples, he shows that in share auction(or multi-unit 
auction) the seller may experience a considerable reduction in revenue compared to 
single unit auction. Regarding the comparison of the two auction formats, he gave a 
very brief and intuitive mention that the change of auction format does not affect the 
revenue because the bidders will respond to this maneuver by altering their strategies 
which have the exactly same allocation and payment as before the change.9  
                                                 
         9 Suppose the sale price and the optimal bid function in single price auction are p and x(p) and 
those in multiple price auction are q, q(y). Then each bidder will receive the same allocation and pay the 
same amount to the seller if his two strategies in the two types auctions are related by the equation, 
p(x)x=∫x q(y)q. Differentiating this equation with respect to x yields the relationship q(x)=p(x)+xp’(x). 
Thus, from his strategy for one auction, he can easily derive a corresponding strategy for an alternative. 
The consequence for the seller is that the sale price is reduced by converting to multiple price auction 
but his revenue remains unchanged.   
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         Since Wilson’s setup is mostly accepted in the recent literatures to deal with 
multi-unit auction including the Treasury auction, I will also follow his basic setup and 
take the “residual supply” as the key feature to assess the probability distribution of 
market clearing price.  
         After Wilson, many counterarguments to the earlier findings which are basically 
similar to the predictions in the single unit auction have been suggested. Back and 
Zender(1993) pointed out that bidders’ marginal cost depends on other’s strategies due 
to involving the residual supply. They showed that the single price auction may be 
much worse than multiple price auction in terms of revenue because in the single price 
auction bidders tend to submit steeper demand schedules so that the marginal cost to a 
bidder may increase by forming steeper residual supply curve.  Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
and Kahn(1998a and 1998b), using the case of two units to be sold, show that bidders 
shade the highest bid more and lowest bid less in a multiple price auction while the 
shading behavior is reversed in single price auction. They conclude that both auction 
formats are not efficient and the revenue equivalence between them are broken down. 
         More recently, Ausubel (1997) and Ausubel and Crampton (2002) criticized 
again the imperfect analogy between the single unit and multi unit auction and called 
the thought of no bid shading and efficient allocation in the single price auction as 
“Single Price Auction Fallacy”. They extended Back and Zender and Engelbrecht-
wiggans and Kahn’s results to an entire set of equilibria and the interdependent value 
environment and argued that the outcomes from single price auction are not efficient 
due to the existence of bid shading(demand reduction) and the differential bid shading 
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over quantity. Since in the single price auction bid on later units can be pivotal, and 
bidders try to shade more for later units to pay less on the earlier units.  
         A simple example of how this yields inefficiency is illustrated in Figure 4.10 In 
the figure, there are only two bidders. Each bidder’s marginal true valuation is drawn 
by a solid line but their actual bid schedules are drawn by dashed and dotted lines 
respectively. We see that there is differential bid shading over the bid quantity. Now, 
suppose that total supply of the auction is Q and that market clearing price is set at 
“mcp” line. Then bidder 2 will win q2 and bidder 1 will q1 such that q1+q2=Q.  
However, since bidder 2’s true valuation is higher than bidder 1’s at all quantities up to 
total supply Q, the efficient allocation should allocate the whole amount of Q to 
bidder2. Thus this mechanism is not efficient in the sense that one who values more 
will not get the good.  
         However in the multiple price auction this incentive is not very strong, they tend 
to shade bids by similar amounts and an efficient outcome can be more possible. This 
does not mean that multiple price auction is always efficient or should be preferred to 
the single price auction. Instead they find that generally the multiple price auction is 
not efficient at its equilibrium.            
 
                                                 
         10 This graph combines two graphs depicted in Ausubel and Crampton(2002) p24.   
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FIGURE 4. Illustration of Differential Bid Shading 
 
         Regarding the revenue comparison, they concluded the inherent ambiguity in 
revenue ranking between the two formats by suggesting several counterexamples 
which yield contradictory revenue rankings. They also suggest several theorems about 
the relationship between efficiency and the revenue maximization. To be summarized, 
with symmetric bidders and flat demands, the revenue maximization coincides with 
efficiency, that is, the revenue maximizing auction awards all quantity to the buyers 
who value them the most. However, this does not generalize to the case of downward-
sloping demand curves.11 Whether the revenue maximizing assignment distorts the 
efficient assignment depends on the distribution of uncertainty. Their conclusion is that 
                                                 
         11  Maskin & Riley(1989) determine the optimal selling procedure in the case of downward 
sloping demand and they find that it typically does not result in an efficient assignment. 
  
Q q1        q2 
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for all distributions other than the exponential distribution, there is a conflict between 
revenue maximization and efficiency with downward sloping demands.      
         In conclusion, theoretical studies for multi-unit auction get to the following 
points: 
          Firstly, contrary to earlier studies, the single price auction reveals a certain type 
of demand(or bid) reductions. Secondly, the type of bid reduction may be different 
from each other. More specifically, more shading for higher bid price is usual in the 
multiple price auction whereas, there is more shading for lower price in the single price 
auction. Thirdly, due to different types of bid shading, the revenue ranking between the 
two auction mechanisms is inherently ambiguous. Finally, the single price auction may 
more severely distort efficiency.  
         As I mentioned earlier, with keeping these findings in mind, I will follow the 
Wilson’s setup and utilize Nautz’s idea for the extension to discrete strategy space 
when constructing my theoretical model. I will also try to find empirical evidence for 
these theoretical predictions with the Korean Treasury auction data. 
 
2.2 Empirical Literatures 
 
         Due to the complexity involved in the multi-unit auction environment, the 
theoretical approaches have not provided any conclusive results yet. Naturally 
considerable endeavor to find answers to the questions addressed have been devoted 
from the empirical side, as well. There are two distinctive empirical approaches to 
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compare auction revenues between the multiple price auction and the single price 
auction. 
 
2.2.1 Policy Experiment 
 
         This approach is to investigate the coefficient of dummy variable for the change 
of an auction mechanism in a carefully designed regression model which sets the 
variable indicating bidders’ markup or profit from the auction as a dependent variable. 
If the coefficient is significant, then this indicates that the switch of the auction format 
affects the bidders’ bid price and consequently seller’s auction revenue. Also the sign 
tells which auction format is preferable regards to revenue. 
         To take this approach, the researcher should have the aggregate data from both 
auction formats. He also has to construct the appropriate dependent variable that 
captures the economic rents acquired by the bidders well. This variable has been 
usually the differential between the weighted average bid price of the auction and 
when-issued market rate or resale market rate of the Treasury bonds. This implies that 
when-issued or resale market rate is considered as the true value of the bond to be 
auctioned, and consequently this approach makes the common value assumption for 
the underlying bidders’ value structure. In addition, this approach needs to carefully 
consider what kinds of independent variables should be included in the regression 
model to control possible effects of the sources other than the switch of auction format 
on the dependent variable. 
 21
         Many researchers have tried to investigate the revenue changes with this 
approach, but they have reported different results across countries or data periods. 
Umlauf(1993) analyzed the Mexican 30 day Treasury Bill auction results which 
consisted of 181 multiple price auctions and  26 single price auctions from August 
1986 to May 1991. He used the weighted average resale market price as a benchmark 
of true value and calculated the auction profit taking the ratio of this price to the 
weighted average bid prices of the auctions. Higher auction profit means that bidders 
obtain the bills at a relatively cheaper price than at resale market price. As the control 
variables, he included the overnight lending market rate, the number of bidders, the 
variance of bid prices, the total quantity for sale, and the dummy variable for the single 
price auction. Since he cared about that the six largest bidders accounted for an 
immense number of shares in the auction purchases in the Mexican Treasury auction 
market, he included the number of bidders and the variance of bid prices to capture the 
degree of competition and collusion.12 He found that the coefficient of dummy for 
single price auction was -2.44, and interpreted the result as the single price auction 
having superior revenue to the multiple price auction.  
         Simon(1994) used the results of auction for 15~30 year maturity Treasury bonds 
in U.S. The data covered 1973 to 1976 in which 6 single price auctions and 10 multiple 
price auctions were held. As the dependent variable, he constructed the bidders’ 
“markup” rate measured by the average winning rates minus when-issued market rate 
                                                 
         12 A wider dispersion of bid prices suggests failure of large bidders to rig their bids collectively and 
more competitive auction.  
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at 1PM of the date of auction. Since he used the rates submitted without converting 
these to the prices higher “markup” means actually “markdown” in terms of bid price. 
It might be notable that he included a deterministic time trend to guard the possibility 
of omitting variables which are trending over the sample period. In his regression, the 
coefficient of dummy for single price auction was 0.08 which implied  that “markup” 
is 8 basis points higher in the single price auction than  the multiple price auction. 
Therefore he argued that the revenue from the single price auction decreased compared 
to the multiple price auction. 
         Nyborg and Sundaresan(1996)13 and Malvey and Archibald(1998) also analyzed 
U.S. data but they did not find statistically significant difference in the revenue 
between the two auction formats.  
 
2.2.2 Structural Model Approach 
  
         As I briefly mentioned in CHAPTER I, the “policy experiment approach” has 
several shortcomings. The most important one is that it cannot analyze the strategic 
behavior occurring in the bidder level and the distributional aspects of the individual 
                                                 
         13  In fact, they were more interested in the effect of the auction format on the pattern of 
information release at different times in the when-issued market. If the pre-auction trading is more 
active, then the information about the value of the Treasury bill to be auctioned which bidders have in 
mind is more likely to be revealed so that it may help bidders to avoid the winner’s curse. They found 
that the pre-auction trading was more active in single price auction than in multiple price auction.   
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bid data. Hence with this approach we cannot obtain richer empirical information for 
the predictions made in the recent theoretical papers.    
         Recently the “structural model approach” has been highlighted as an alternative 
to the “policy experimental approach”. In fact, in the case of the single unit auction, 
there have been more a than a few attempts to estimate using this approach both 
parametrically and nonparametrically. However for multi-unit auction case, very few 
studies can be found due to the complexity of problems.   
         The common feature of the structural model approach is to derive the optimal bid 
condition which is mapping the observed bid data to the unknown but concerned 
variables by solving the certain theoretical model. Then we try to estimate the 
components of this condition which in most cases would be the distribution of the 
unknown variables. Using these estimated distributions, we can estimate or recover the 
unknown variables.  
         The first attempt of applying this approach to the Treasury auction is found in 
Heller and Lengwiler(1998). They analyzed the Swiss Treasury market using the 
theoretical model which had been suggested by Nautz(1995) and concluded that the 
shift to the single auction improved the Treasury’s revenue in Swiss. However, as we 
have known from the previous section, Nautz’s model made a price taker assumption 
so that the derived optimal condition was not the right form when we consider bidders’ 
strategic interactions.       
         More recently, Hortaçsu(2002) has accomplished immense development in both 
the theoretical model and the empirical methodology. He constructed a more complete 
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model reflecting the strategic characteristics by adopting Wilson(1979)’s setup and 
derived the optimal condition for multiple price auction. He also extended the the 
method of nonparametric estimation suggested by Gurre et al.(2000) to multi-unit 
auction case to estimate bidders’ true valuations. He applied this method to the Turkish 
13-week Treasury bill auctions. The data analyzed covered 25 auctions which held 
under the multiple price auctions from Oct. 1991 to Oct. 1993. His ex-post revenue 
comparison showed the revenue loss in the single price auction and ex-ante revenue 
comparison could not reject the revenue equality hypothesis. 
         Since I couldn’t find any further advance after Hortaçsu(2002) in dealing with the 
multi-unit auction, I will take his attainments as the starting point of this paper and 
attempt to extend his ideas and methods to the single price auction.     
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE KOREAN TREASURY AUCTION AND DATA 
 
3.1 The Korean Treasury Auction Market  
 
         The Korean Treasury has auctioned Treasury bonds since 1994. However, before 
1998, the infrastructure of the Treasury bond market was not fully developed so that 
the auction system operated imperfectly. For example, there existed a minimum cut off 
price which was internally fixed by the Treasury before the auction, and an implicit 
assignment for the remaining quantities which were not fulfilled in an auction was 
executed. Therefore a true type of an auction is said to have begun in the middle of 
1999 when the minimum cut off price was abolished and the primary dealer system 
was introduced. 
         As for the auction mechanism, the multiple price auction system had been 
adopted until July 2000,14 but this was completely converted to the single price auction 
as of August 2000.  
         The maturities of TB to be auctioned are diversified to 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. All 
of them are coupon bearing bonds. The interest according to their coupon is paid  
quarterly. Among them the 3-year TB makes up 40~50% of the issuing amount. The 
                                                 
         14 Although not many, there were a few cases that single price auction system was applied to sell 
the long-term bonds like 7 and 10 years maturity bonds. 
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auction is held regularly. The auction date is fixed by the maturity date; usually a 3 
year bond is auctioned on the Monday of 2nd week of every month and the other 
maturities in the 1st or 3rd week of every month. The auction amount is pre announced 
around 3~5 days prior to the auction date. 
         After the Treasury introduced the primary dealer system, the participants in the 
auction market are restricted to 28~38 financial institutions which are designated as 
Primary Dealer(PD) or the approved candidates of PD. All of PDs are either 
commercial banks or security houses(or brokerage firms), and the portion of each 
group in PD group is  around 50:50. The long-term investors such as pension funds, 
investment trust companies, and insurance companies can not be designated as PDs so 
that they are prohibited from submitting the bids directly to the auction. They do  
constitute an important and potential demand for TB by placing their orders onto PDs. 
         Each bidder is asked to specify a yield and a quantity demanded at that yield. 
Yields have to be specified up to the second decimal place. With a simple calculation 
method, yields can be converted to prices as the amount a bidder is willing to pay for 
one unit of TB with a face value of 10000 Korean Won(KW) and a certain coupon 
accruing the periodic interest payments.15 In all the multiple price auctions and some 
single price auctions, the coupon rates were set to the quantity weighted average of the 
                                                 
         15 To convert yield to price, I use a conventional way which is widely used in the market. The 
arithmetic formula is given by: 
∑
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winning yields after the auction. In these cases, with setting this yield to be 10000 KW, 
the bidding yields are converted to the bid prices in the same way.  
         Quantities are specified in terms of the face value of TB the bidder wants to buy.  
The minimum quantity increment which a bidder is allowed to submit is 0.1 million 
KW(around $83,000). In practice the bidders increase their bid quantities by the 5 
billion Korean Won(around $4 million). The maximum number of yield-quantity pairs 
is restricted up to 5. Bids are submitted by 3:00 pm on Monday and auction results are 
announced at 4~4:30 pm on the same day. The date of settlement is Wednesday. 
         As for secondary markets for trading TB, there are two distinguishable markets. 
One is the exchange market managed by Korean Stock Exchange(KSE) and the other 
is the conventional over-the-counter(OTC) market. The exchange market by KSE was 
established in May of 1999. This market uses a fully computerized trading system and 
an individual auction method at multiple price quotes. These two markets are 
complimentary to each other and contribute to revitalizing the TB trade and deepening 
the secondary market for TB.  
 
3.2 Data 
      
         The data is for 1, 3, 5, and 10 year maturity TB auctions which were held 
betweens September 1999 and April 2002. Except for 3 year maturity TB, the time 
span which the data covers is severely unbalanced between the multi price auction 
period and the single price auction period. Especially, in the case of 1 or 10 year TB, 
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the data for one of the two different auction formats are not available. In addition, the 
portion of 3 year maturity TB in the auction market possesses the largest volume and 
the participation in 3 year maturity TB auction is more active than the 5 year maturity 
TB. Therefore, in order to analyze both multi price auction and single price auction 
data, I will only use the 3 year maturity TB auction data. 
        Table 1 describes the summary statistics of my data set. According to the auction 
format used, there were 10 multiple price auctions and 20 single price auctions which 
makes a total number of 30 auctions.16  
The original data consists of the quantity of TB supplied, pairs of yield and 
quantity submitted by each bidder, the market clearing yield for each auction, and the 
TB trading yield in the secondary market for the same period. 
         As I mentioned before, since bidders bid in terms of yield, I converted bid yields 
to price in the unit of the Korean Won while setting the market clearing yield for each 
auction to be 10000 KW. A 0.01%p in bid yield represents an increase or decrease by 
about 3 KW in terms of price. Quantities are also normalized by the ratio to the total 
supply of each auction so that total supply of each auction is normalized to be 1. 
         Regarding the number of bidders, i.e., primary dealers, during the sample period 
38 PDs appeared in the auction, but every PD did not always participate in the auction. 
There have been a few cases of either some were newly designated as PD or some 
were disqualified as a PD because they quit their business or were merged with other 
                                                 
         16  I drop 2 auctions from original sample, one from multiple price auction period and the other 
from single price auction, due to the lack of appropriate data.  
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institutions. There are six bans and six security houses among the 38 bidders who enter 
into or exit from the group of PDs in the middle of the sample period.17  
         My data set consists of a total 2,499 bid points which are pairs of bid price and 
quantity. The statistics for bid prices, bid quantities, and other indicators of data are 
summarized in Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
         17 The bidders who showed discontinuity in participation are as follows: (I use bidder code number 
instead of the name of institution) 
   - banks : #7(~2000.5), #9(~2000.11), #10(~2000.9), #15(~2000.9), #17(2000.10~), #18(2002.1~) 
    - security houses : #33(2000.10~), #34~ #38(2002.1~) 
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TABLE 1  Summary Statistics on 30 Auctions, Sep. 1999~Apr. 2002 
Date Auction Format 
# of  
bidders 
# of  
bid points 
submitted 
Total 
Supply 
(Bill KW) 
Total 
bidding 
Amount 
(Bill KW) 
Market  
Clearing 
Yield 
(%) 
9/13/1999 Multi 28 107 1200 2535 9.39
10/11/1999 Multi 31 111 1357 3565 8.39
11/15/1999 Multi 28 108 1185 2238 8.37
1/17/2000 Multi 29 107 764 2275 9.58
2/14/2000 Multi 30 115 1228 4230 8.99
3/13/2000 Multi 29 97 664 1910 9.04
4/10/2000 Multi 30 104 840 3038 8.83
5/8/2000 Multi 27 86 762 1920 8.84
6/12/2000 Multi 23 67 600 976 8.61
7/10/2000 Multi 25 63 586 1140 7.92
8/14/2000 Single 23 74 600 1349 7.70
9/18/2000 Single 24 57 900 1260 8.15
10/9/2000  Single 23 80 900 1935 7.84
11/13/2000 Single 25 82 950 2310 7.00
1/8/2001 Single 26 74 750 1895 6.00
2/5/2001 Single 24 48 770 1170 5.39
3/12/2001 Single 23 39 500 770 6.10
4/2/2001 Single 26 64 800 1710 6.60
5/7/2001 Single 25 59 600 1350 6.52
6/4/2001 Single 26 70 400 1430 6.10
7/2/2001 Single 27 88 400 1800 5.86
8/6/2001 Single 26 79 700 1990 5.38
9/3/2001 Single 24 69 850 1790 5.03
10/8/2001 Single 26 95 890 2380 4.40
11/7/2001 Single 26 73 750 1590 4.88
12/3/2001 Single 25 81 1100 1830 5.65
1/7/2002 Single 27 118 1200 4200 6.10
2/4/2002 Single 24 65 400 1400 5.94
3/4/2002 Single 23 77 500 1740 5.92
4/1/2002 Single 24 77 570 1760 6.44
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TABLE 2  Summary Statistics on Bidding Data at Each Auction 
Bid amont 
(Bill KW) 
Winning amount 
(Bill KW) Bid price(KW) Date 
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
Avg. 
#of 
Bid 
Points
Avg. 
win 
Bid 
Points Mean* Max Min 
9/13/1999 90.5 300 10 57.0 300 5 3.82 2.67 9996.74 10028.50 9945.86 
10/11/1999 115.0 350 10 52.2 203.1 7.2 3.74 2.08 9996.22 10010.52 9971.15 
11/15/1999 79.9 290 10 47.4 200.3 8.6 3.86 2.24 9998.76 10010.52 9973.76 
1/17/2000 78.4 180 20 28.3 70.7 2.1 3.79 2.07 9996.34 10012.91 9974.24 
2/14/2000 141.0 385 20 45.5 145 5 4.13 2.33 9998.76 10010.42 9989.59 
3/13/2000 65.9 150 10 26.6 115 2 3.59 2.20 9997.95 10007.81 9976.62 
4/10/2000 101.3 340 20 36.5 210 2 3.70 1.83 9997.60 10007.83 9984.35 
5/8/2000 71.1 165 10 34.6 72 1 3.63 2.27 9998.53 10005.22 9989.57 
6/12/2000 42.4 180 10 28.9 108.7 1 3.00 2.60 10002.10 10020.97 9973.86 
7/10/2000 45.6 120 10 27.9 100 1 2.64 2.05 9997.27 10015.89 9731.74 
8/14/2000 58.7 130 15 29.1 81 5 3.22 2.00 9999.43 10066.66 9973.48 
9/18/2000 52.5 170 10 42.9 156 7 2.38 1.90 10001.10 10026.42 9908.17 
10/9/2000 84.1 220 10 40.7 184 5 3.61 2.05 9999.69 10015.92 9984.11 
11/13/2000 92.4 210 10 45.2 137 9 3.36 1.86 9996.59 10018.82 9946.47 
1/8/2001 72.9 220 10 41.4 100 10 2.92 1.83 10005.24 10276.98 9975.49 
2/5/2001 48.8 160 10 36.7 100 10 2.00 1.43 10008.31 10052.46 9969.77 
3/12/2001 33.5 80 10 21.7 60 5 1.78 1.26 10005.58 10054.62 9891.77 
4/2/2001 65.4 240 10 38.1 160 10 2.62 2.05 9987.18 10067.80 9892.61 
5/7/2001 54.0 150 10 28.6 110 5 2.56 1.52 9999.35 10046.11 9948.76 
6/4/2001 56.2 150 10 21.1 50 5 2.77 1.32 9996.59 10027.27 9975.53 
7/2/2001 67.8 140 10 33.3 90 10 3.33 1.58 9987.29 10016.41 9953.67 
8/6/2001 76.9 220 10 38.9 195 5 3.15 1.56 9997.23 10022.06 9967.02 
9/3/2001 74.6 180 10 40.5 180 10 3.04 2.05 9999.97 10036.06 9966.84 
10/8/2001 92.7 180 20 35.6 90 10 3.85 1.84 9993.69 10028.01 9960.94 
11/7/2001 61.2 140 10 30.0 80 10 2.92 1.88 9997.66 10036.15 9966.76 
12/3/2001 73.2 180 10 45.8 115 10 3.32 2.38 10002.18 10030.21 9986.30 
1/7/2002 161.5 500 30 57.1 240 5 4.52 2.10 9994.36 10030.00 9953.84 
2/4/2002 59.6 150 10 28.6 80 5 2.79 1.93 9995.83 10024.60 9970.03 
3/4/2002 75.7 150 10 29.4 85 5 3.52 1.88 9994.97 10024.61 9972.74 
4/1/2002 73.3 140 10 35.6 80 10 3.33 5.00 9993.84 10024.41 9970.26 
* quantity weight average bid price = ∑∑∑∑
= == =
×
N
i
K
k
ikt
N
i
K
k
iktikt qqb
1 11 1
/)(  
where (bikt , qikt ): bidder i’s kth bid price and bid amount(increment) at auction t  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE BIDDING MODEL WITH PIV SETTING AND 
SYMMETRIC BIDDER 
 
4.1 Discussion about the Assumptions 
 
         In order to perform the structural model estimation, we should have a theoretical 
model which reflects the auction environment well. In this CHAPTER, I set up the 
model and solve for the tractable optimal condition which will be the object of 
estimation. 
         Since the auction problem involves asymmetry of information18  between the 
seller and the bidders and among the bidders as its crucial element, it fits well into the 
non cooperative game situation under incomplete information. If we model our auction 
problem in this way, the next thing to do is to find out the optimal strategy or bid 
function which constitutes the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. 
         However, when one tries to design the auction model, one must be cautious of 
which assumptions should be imposed on the model setting. The important 
considerations which have been usually taken into account are the underlying valuation 
structure of bidder, symmetric or asymmetric bidders, and bidders’ attitude toward 
                                                 
         18 That is, the seller does not know any bidders’ valuation of the item for sale and one bidder does 
not know other bidders’ valuation either. 
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risk. In addition, some researchers pointed out the case of uncertain supply, stochastic 
participation problem and the matter of collusion among bidders.    
         Henceforth, considering the institutional characteristics and the market 
environment in Korea, I will try to rationalize the assumptions which I make in 
modeling the Korean TB auction. 
         First of all, regarding the possibility of uncertain supply and stochastic 
participation, I will treat both total supply(Q) and the number of bidders(N) as common 
knowledge which is fixed exogenously. As for the total supply, since this amount is 
announced before the auction as common knowledge to all bidders in Korea and the 
Treasury does not exercise any kind of ex post cancellation of competitive bids, we can 
think of the total supply as not being random. In the case of the number of participants, 
the bidders are restricted to the Primary Dealers designated by the Treasury as 
mentioned before, and we can see very stable participation from the number of bidders 
across time in Table 1, and this can also be assumed to be not random. However, many 
potential bidders do exist who are not PDs but demand TB with non trivial amounts 
such as for pension funds and insurance companies. Since these long term investors 
have to acquire TB through PDs more fluctuation in number of bids from Table 1 may 
indicate the variation in demand by these institutions. Since the accurate information 
about the participation of the potential bidders at each individual auction is not 
available I will adopt the assumption of a fixed number of bidders as was usually made 
in the previous literatures. 
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         Regarding the bidders’ risk attitude, the main risk that bidders are facing in the 
auction is the risk of being forced to rely on secondary market to satisfy demand.19 
Therefore, if the value of the individual bids is relatively small with respect to a 
bidder’s total assets, a likely scenario, risk neutrality appears as a reasonable 
assumption. This argument seems to be the case in the Korean Treasury auction 
because the TB is just one financial instrument among the various financial goods for 
financial institutions to invest in such as stocks, corporate bonds, foreign exchange, 
and many other financial derivatives. The bidders’ size of funds allocated to buy TB 
may not be a big portion of their total assets. Of course, when bids are solely for 
fulfilling some type of  a reserve requirement, then a bidder may be sensitive to the 
risk. However, since bidders’ demands are a mixture of many different types so as to 
be very hard to be  clarified, I will simply assume a risk-neutral bidder.20 
         The assumption of symmetric bidders implies that bidders are entirely alike in 
their characteristics, that is, whatever is an optimal bidding strategy for anyone bidder 
uses the same optimal strategy in preparing his bid. In a theoretical model, symmetry is 
represented by the assumption that every bidder has the same distribution about a 
certain latent value such as the unknown true value of an item for sale or a signal 
which each bidder perceives before the auction. 
                                                 
         19 Because bidders can buy securities in the secondary market, the risk may be evaluated by (value-
[pauction-p2nd mkt]). 
         20 There are a few papers that model risk aversion in the single unit auction but not in the multi unit 
auction. In particular, the papers focusing on TB auction is usually assuming risk neutral bidder. In 
single unit auction, when bidders are risk averse, they have an incentive to raise the probability of 
winning by marginally increasing their bid, hence the seller can do strictly better with risk averse bidders.     
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         Whether this assumption is valid for the Korean auction situation may be 
questionable because the bidders are composed of two different types of financial 
institutions, which are the banks and the security houses. However, for the time being I 
will assume symmetry so that I can focus on finding a symmetric Nash equilibrium for 
my model. This will provide a benchmark model. In CHAPTER VII, I will attempt to 
reinvestigate the validity of the symmetry assumption and to extend the model and the 
estimation by considering the possibility of asymmetry among the bidders.  
         The most important and controversial assumption is the underlying value 
structure. In most applications of auction theory, researchers typically choose to work 
within one of two very different theoretical settings. One is the private (independent) 
value paradigm(PIV) and the other is the common value paradigm(CV). In the PIV 
setting, each risk-neutral bidder knows the value of the object to himself, but does not 
know the value of the object to the other bidders. The values are modeled as being 
independently drawn from some continuous distribution. In contrast, CV setting 
assumes that the value of the object to the various bidders can be regarded as equal, but 
the bidders may have differing estimates of the common value. 
         Milgrom and Weber(1982) provided the general functional formula which 
captured these two paradigms.21 Each bidder possesses some information concerning 
the object for sale; let X=(X1, …, Xn) be a vector, the components of which are the real-
valued informational variables(or value estimates, signals, or bidder’s type) available 
to each bidder only, i, and S=(S1,…, Sm) be a vector of additional real-valued variables 
                                                 
21 see Milgrom and Weber(1982), p1093, pp1097-1098.      
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available to all the bidders commonly.  The actual value of the object to bidder i may 
be denoted by Vi=vi(S, X). Then PIV is represented by the case of m=0 and each Vi=Xi,  
while CV is the case of m=1 and each Vi=S1. Usually PIV also assumes the commonly 
known distribution function of Xi, Fi so that Vi is assumed to be drawn the distribution 
function Fi. In CV, if V is the unobserved true common value, then the bidders’ 
perceived value Vi, i=1,…,n, are independent draws from some probability distribution 
G(S|V) which is already known to all the bidders.  
         Which value paradigm is most appropriate to the Korean TB auction situation? 
Through the literature survey, it seems that the assumption chosen depends on the 
purpose and methodology of the study and the consideration of the simplicity of the 
model. Overall, the empirical papers using the policy experimental approach adopted 
the assumption of CV while those using the structural model approach chose the PIV 
paradigm.22 In the case of the theoretical papers, the assumptions vary by authors.   
                                                 
         22  The theoretical papers can be divided as following according to the value structure 
assumption. 
PIV CV IDV 
Haris & Raviv(81), Maskin & 
Riley(89), Nautz(95), 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans & 
Kahn(98a and 98b) 
Smith(66), Scott & Wolf(79), 
Wilson(79), Back & Zender(93) 
Ausbel & Crampton (02) 
           In case of the empirical papers, 
CV PIV 
Umlauf(93)*, Nyborg & Sundaresen(96)*, 
Malvey & Archibaid(98)*, Simon(94)* 
Heller & Lengwiler(98)** 
Hortacsu(02)** 
*Policy Experimental papers / **Structural Model papers 
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         The value structure may be determined by many sources but one of the most 
important factors may be the nature of the objects being auctioned.23   In the case of the 
TB, the characteristic of the objects, i.e., bonds to be issue, can vary by the bidders’ 
purpose in buying them. That is, if  bidders participate in the auction to get the bonds 
for the purpose of holding them up to the maturity, then the underlying value structure 
can be assumed to be close to the PIV setting. If their purpose is to obtain the bonds is 
to trade them in the secondary market, then the value of the bonds to be auctioned  may 
be governed by a CV setting because every bidder must consider the forecasted value 
of the price in the secondary market which is unknown but possibly common to all the 
bidders before the auction.24  However we cannot reject the possibility of a more 
general value structure because bidders can participate in the Treasury auction with 
both purposes at the same time.  
         Unfortunately, the way to test of the underlying value structure has not been 
developed for multi unit auction models. Therefore, instead of proceeding with more 
detailed discussions about the value structure, I will assume a PIV setting following the 
convention of the previous papers dealing with the structural model estimation. 
However I will attempt to test the existence of common value components with 
scrutinizing the demand structure of the bidders more carefully in CHAPTER VII to 
reinvestigate the validity of PIV assumption in the Korean market.   
                                                 
         23 In general, the PIV is more applicable to auctions for non-durable consumer goods. However the 
CV may apply to the auction for oil, gas and mineral rights on a certain tract of land where the value of 
the object depends on the unknown amount of recoverable reserve. 
         24 This logic is usually found in the policy experimental approach literatures.  
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         When we assume PIV, the possible sources of private information for the value 
of TB could be25: 
 
1) Each bidder may have a different reserve requirement for TB or a different 
availability of liquidity which is not known to their rivals. 
2) Each bidder may have a unique business relationship with his own customers 
who place the orders for purchasing the TB.   
3) Each bidder may have a different expectation or a different forecasting 
capability about the future resale price of the TB.  
 
         Related to the value structure, there is one other thing to be considered. Since the 
TB is a divisible good, the valuation may be the function of quantities demanded. That 
is whether each bidder has a constant marginal value over the total quantities 
demanded by the bidder i, qi, or bidders’ marginal values are smoothly decreasing with 
quantity. These are called a “flat demand” assumption and a “downward-sloping 
demand” assumption respectively. The flat demand assumption was discussed in earlier 
literatures in which bidders possessed unit demands, and in particular it provided a 
generalization of Milgrom and Weber’s(1982) model of an auction for a single 
object.26 However we discussed the limits of a unit demand model in CHAPTER II, 
                                                 
         25 Hortaçsu (2002) pointed out 1) and 3) as possible sources of private information.    
         26 See Ausbel and Crampton(2002). They first adopted flat demand assumption to simplifies their 
analysis and found even if the valuation is constant the bid may be reduced at the later demanded units 
under single price auction scheme.  
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and it might result in the fallacy of imperfect analogy of the single unit auction. 
Furthermore, if the flat demand makes sense, the bidder is more likely to submit only a 
single bid or demands an identical fraction of the total supply. However this 
expectation is easily rejected in my sample statistics in CHAPTER III.27 Therefore, I 
will assume a downward sloping demand, that is, the first derivative of value function 
with respect to quantity is weakly negative. 
          Finally, as for the actual demand or bid function submitted by bidders, various 
types of assumptions may be imposed. Previous researchers applied one or two among 
the three assumptions. Those are unit-demand model, demand schedule model, and 
lumpy bidding or discrete model.28  
        Unit-demand model assumes that each bidder bids for only one of the several 
units and can only choose only the prices. Most of the results from this model are 
extensions of the theories from the single-unit auction and no conclusions can be 
drawn as to the strategic role of quantity choices. Demand schedules model assumes 
that bidders submit schedules starting at the different prices at which they wish to pay 
for the various quantities. Furthermore it assumes perfectly divisible price-quantity 
decisions. These models always induce regular (value-monotonic) allocations.  
         In the real world, a TB auction usually has the smallest price increment and a 
minimum bid quantity restriction. Bidders can place several units of demand at one 
price. This phenomenon may arise endogenously, but may also originate in 
                                                 
         27 From Table 2, we find that average number of bids used by bidders is 3~4 and that quantities by 
the bidders show wide variation.   
         28  See Tenario(1997) 
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exogenously imposed minimum quantities. Therefore, it is natural that bidders submit 
a finite number of price-quantity pairs and do lumpy bidding which translates into 
several units demanded at one price. This results in “step-wise” bid functions instead 
of continuous functions.29 
         Step-wise bid function is also plausible in the Korean situation. The Korean 
treasury imposes a minimum price increment which is up to two decimal points in 
terms of percentage. The minimum bid quantity is around 0.1 million dollars and the 
bidder can increase the bid amount by the unit of 0.1 million dollars. There is a 
maximum quantity restriction where only 30% of the total supply can be purchased by 
one bidder.  
         Although the step-wise bid functions are more realistic, in order to get a more 
comprehensive understanding and to help recognize the distinction by the demand 
                                                 
         29 Different equilibrium outcomes may arise depending upon the assumption of the continuous or 
discrete bid functions. Fabra, et al.(2004), in their analysis of electricity auction markets with step bid 
functions, found that there exists a unique, competitive outcome in the single price auction independent 
of the number of admissible steps in each supplier’s bid function, so as long as this number is finite. In 
fact, Wilson(1979) and Back and Zender(1993) showed that in the single price auction with continuous 
bid functions, some of the equilibria may be extremely collusive-like which yield very low revenues for 
the auctioneer because a bidder’s incentive to price more aggressively is offset by the large decrease in 
price that is required to capture an increment in quantity when bidders offer very steep bid functions at 
the equilibria. However, when bidders are limited to a finite number of price-quantity bids, a positive 
increment in quantity can always be obtained by just slightly undercutting the price of a rival’s unit. 
Hence the collusive-like equilibria found in the continuous auction cannot be implemented. With this 
finding, they raised some doubt on the relevance of applying the continuous share auction model to 
electricity markets in which participants are limited to a small number of offer prices per generating 
unit.  
 41
function, I will start to deal with the continuous case first and then extend the analysis 
to the discrete case.  
          
4.2 The Model with PIV and Symmetric Bidder-Continuous Case 
 
         First, I will work with the continuous space of strategies which deal with both the 
bid price and the bid quantities which are assumed to be continuous variables. I will 
also assume that the bid schedule or the bidder’s strategy function is strictly decreasing 
to quantities and that the bid function is differentiable in the continuous case. I will 
basically follow the approach and the notations adopted by Hortaçsu(2002) using the 
share auction setup of Wilson(1979).     
         Let the total supply be Q and the number of bidders be N(denoted by i = 1,…,N , 
N ≥ 2) which are commonly known to bidders. Bidders are assumed to be symmetric in 
the sense that optimal bid for one bidder is also optimal to others. Also bidders are 
assumed to be risk neutral. 
         Let vi be the true valuation(or demand) for TB of bidder i,  ti be the private signal 
only known to i, and s be commonly known signal among bidders. Then generally 
bidder i’s marginal valuation function is given by  vi = vi (q, ti, s)  with vq ≤ 0 and ti & s 
may be correlated. However, since I restrict my concern to the PIV and symmetric 
bidders, the valuation function vi (q, ti, s)=v(q, ti).  
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         In addition, I denote submitted demand schedule of bidder i, by yi(p) which is 
assumed to be strictly decreasing, differentiable and to constitute Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium. Then y--1i(q) represents the bid function of i. 
         At market clearing price(MCP), pc 
           ∑
≠
−=
N
ij
c
j
c
i pyQpy )()(        
         Define the distribution function of MCP conditional on submitting yi(p).   
         ∑
≠
−≤=
N
ij
jii pyQpypypH )}()(Pr{))(,(  )}(|Pr{ pypp i
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4.2.1 Multiple Price Auction30 
           
     Bidder’s expected profit maximization problem will be: 
 
(1)           ∫ ∫∞ −−0 )(0 1(.) ))(,(})](),([{max
cpy cc
iy
pypdHdqqytqv  
 
         Note that I have dropped the i subscript from the demand function.     
         Let the term in the {   } be π(y(p)), surplus from winning y(p), then  
 )('))](()),(([ 1 pypyytpyv
dp
dq
dq
d
dp
d
i
−−=⋅= ππ           
And,  using integrating by parts, we get 
 ∫ ∫∞ ∞∞ −=0 00 ))(())(,())(,())(())(,())(( pydpypHpypHpypypdHpy πππ   
                                                 
         30 The derivation section is based upon Hortaçsu(2002) p32. 
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        Since   if  p=∞    π(y(∞))=0  and   if  p=0   H(0)=0, equation (1) becomes: 
 
(2)            ∫∞ −− 0(.) )('])),(())[(,(max dppyptpyvpypH iyi  
 
         Observe that the integrand is a function of p, y and y’, denote it by F(p,y,y’).  The 
Euler equation which is a necessary condition for optimality is given by  
                                       'yy Fdp
dF =  
         Therefore, the Euler condition for the differential equation (2) is given by   
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ip
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4.2.2 Single Price Auction 
 
         Since the change in the auction format affects the bidders’ optimal behaviors 
resulting in a different distribution of MCP, I will use a different notation for the bid 
function and distribution of MCP denoted by x(p) and  I(p,x(p)) respectively.  
         Bidder’s expected profit maximization problem in single price auction will be: 
 
(4)          ∫ ∫∞ −0 )(0(.) ))(,()}(),({max px ix pxpdIppxdqtqvi  
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         In the same way, let the fraction of { } be π(x(p))  which is surplus from winning 
x(p) units, then  
)()('])),(([ pxpxptpxv
dp
d
i −−=π           
         Using the same boundary conditions and integrating by parts, (4) becomes 
 
(5)         ∫∞ −−− 0(.) )}()('])),(()){[(,(max dppxpxptpxvpxpI ix  
 
         After solving equation (5), we get (6) as Euler condition for the single price 
auction. 
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4.3 The Model with PIV and Symmetric Bidder-Discrete Case 
 
    Now, instead of a continuous bid function where both prices and quantities are 
perfectly divisible, I will consider the discrete bid function more explicitly. Following 
the Nautz(1995) and Hortaçsu(2002) analysis, I will maintain perfect divisibility of the 
quantities but restrict prices to lie on a discrete grid. The set of possible prices are 
given by  
        110 +<<< Kppp L  
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         Then bid vector submitted by bidder i takes the form of a series of quantities 
specified for each of these prices. 
          }{: 11 +≥≥≥ iKiioi yyyy Lr  
         Note that I impose the monotonicity constraints on quantity bid vector,  
1+≥ ikik yy   to obtain decreasing bid function and account for the unobserved bid 
points. 
         After all bids are submitted, the Treasury determines the market clearing price by 
aggregating the quantity bids for each point on the price grid and finding the price at 
which the total demand falls just short of the total supply: 
                                ∑
=
≤=
N
i
ikk Qykkp
1
* }:min{:* 31 
         If we define the MCP in this way, we do not have to care about a rationing 
problem when several tied bids exist at the market clearing price. Similar to the 
continuous case, define the probability that the MCP is below pk , conditional on the 
bid vector of bidder i,  iy
r
, to be: ),( ik ypH
r
 
         However, since bidders do not always place different quantities for all price 
increments, let  }{ 21 ikLikik yyy >⋅⋅⋅>> be the set of L “observed” quantity bids 
                                                 
         31 Hortaçsu(2002) also defined the MCP in this way, and mentioned that his conversation with the 
participants in the Turkish auction market indicated that the rationing was not a big concern. My 
experience with those in the Korean market tells me that this is the case in Korea as well. However, 
when I compare the revenue or surplus for the comparison, to make it be more accurate I will calculate 
the amount after rationing, applying the actual rationing rule.  
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that the bidder i submits on the price points }{ 21 kLkk ppp <⋅⋅⋅<< which is a 
subset of the entire price grid above. 
         For the time being the value function is assumed to be continuous and 
differentiable. The distribution of market clearing price is assumed to be continuous 
and differentiable with respect to the quantity. I will continue to use different notations 
for the bid vector and the distribution of MCP in multi price auction and single price 
auction which are denoted by iy
r
, H(.) for multi price auction and ix
r
, I(.) for single 
price auction respectively. Since bidders are assumed to be symmetric, I will derive the 
optimal condition by dropping subscript i. 
 
4.3.1 Multiple Price Auction32 
                   
         The expected payoff of a risk neutral bidder who submits the bid vector 
}{: 11 +≥≥≥ ko yyyy Lr will be: 
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         32 The derivation in this part is also basically same as that in Hortaçsu(2002), p33 but I corrected 
the sign of one term in his FOC which should have been reversed.  
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         Note that most of the products with H(pk) and all the products with H(pk) in the  
next adding term cancel out which only ))(),(()( 1
1
+−−× ∫ + kkkyy ik yypdqtqvpH kk  is left 
over.  
         Using this fact and adding the monotonicity constraints,33 we can rewrite the 
Lagrangian as:       
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         The first-order conditions for a maximum are for each j :34 
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         33 Since the Korean Treasury restricts the maximum bid points up to 5, one may wonder if a 
number of bid points should be formalized as a constraint in the model. However, the average number of 
bid points utilized per bidder is 3, so I assume that the constraint on the number of bid points is not 
binding.     
         34  As for the sign of 
j
k
j
k
y
pHand
y
pH
∂
∂
∂
∂ − )()( 1 ,  both have negative signs because 
increasing ones quantity at a particular price point either increase the market clearing price or leaves it 
the same, so that the probability that the market clearing price is below a given price becomes less or 
equal than what it was.  
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         Suppose that we observe strictly increasing quantity bid at every possible price 
point, then the monotoicity constraints are not binding, that is λk= λk-1=0. Hence we 
can solve this equation for v(yk,ti) and we get: 
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         However we can see distinct quantity bids at only a subset of the possible price 
points, }{ 21 ikLikik yyy >⋅⋅⋅>> . We can interpret that the monotonicity constraint 
at the observed quantity bid point is not binding, i.e. λk=0, and at the unobserved points 
the constraint is binding, i.e. λk>0 which means yk=yk+1. 
         For example, suppose that we observe only (p2, y2) and (p5, y5)  but don’t observe 
(p3, y3) , (p4, y4). If we add the first-order conditions for k=3,4,5, we see that the 
Lagrange multipliers,  λ3 and λ4 cancel out from successive equations, and that most of 
the integral terms conveniently vanish using the facts of y3=y4=y5 and that 
jy
H
∂
∂ is the 
same across consecutive equations.  
         Hence the left over is: 
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         After rearranging the terms and solving for v(y5, ti) we get: 
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         Note that this is entirely expressed by the observed bids,  (p2, y2) and (p5, y5).            
         If we rewrite the above equation using general notations of the observed bids, 
}{ 21 ikLikik yyy >⋅⋅⋅>> and }{ 21 ikLikik ppp <⋅⋅⋅<<  
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         In order to get the value of v(ykm , ti) we need to know the exact form of v(q, ti). 
Therefore we will assume that the marginal valuations are given by a step function 
which assume constant values, v(ykm) on (ykm+1, ykm). Figure 5 illustrates our step 
functional marginal valuation. 
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FIGURE 5. Illustration of Step Valuation Function 
 
         Then the integrals in Akm and Bkm can be evaluated and these terms become: 
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         Now, let’s consider the boundary conditions. 
         Firstly the boundary condition for the bid with the lowest price (pk1 ,yk1) :  
         I assume yk1=y0. This is plausible because the bidder is also willing to accept qk1 
units at the minimum price grid, p0. Without loss of generality, we can assume p0=0 
and H(p0)=0.   
         Hence:      
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         Secondly the boundary condition for the bid with the highest price (pkL,ykL) :  
Pk3 
 
Pk2 
 
 
Pk1 
       yk3                       yk2                 yk1 
V(yk3) 
V(yk2) 
V(yk1) 
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         I assume “unobserved bid” for price pkL+1, ykL+1=0 because the bidder is not 
willing to accept any units of the bond for prices above pkL. 
         So: 
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         Hence, given estimates of H(pkm) and  
km
km
y
pH
∂
∂ )( , we have a recursive set of L 
linear equations which we can solve for the “steps” of the marginal valuation function.  
 
4.3.2 Single Price Auction 
 
         The expected payoff of a risk neutral bidder in single price auction is given by: 
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         Note that  
∫∫∫ −− −−−− +−−−=− 11 111100 ),(),(),( kkkk xx kkkkikkx ikkx i xpxpdqtqvxpdqtqvxpdqtqv
         Using this fact, we can rewrite the expected payoff as:       
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         Therefore the Lagrangian of the objective function of a bidder with adding the 
monotonicity constraints can be written as: 
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         The first-order conditions for a maximum are for each k : 
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         Suppose that we can observe strictly increasing quantity bid at every possible 
price point, since  λk= λk-1=0  we can solve this equation for v(xk,ti) and we get: 
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         With the same arguments on observed quantity bids as a subset of the possible 
price points in the multiple price auction case, we can derive the FOC which is 
expressed in terms of only observed bid points. 
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         For example, suppose that we observe only (p2, x2) and (p5, x5) but don’t observe 
(p3, x3) , (p4, x4). Let the first order conditions for k=3,4,5, be [1], [2], and [3] 
respectively. If we get [1]-[2]+[3] and use the fact of x3=x4=x5, then we see that the 
Lagrange multipliers,  λ3 and λ4 cancel out from successive equations, and that most of 
the integral terms conveniently vanish.  
         Hence the left over is: 
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         After rearranging the terms we get: 
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         Now we assume that at the unobserved bid point j, I(pj)-I(pj-1)=0, which implies 
I(p2)=I(p3) in this case.35 This follows because a bidder need not place bid x3 at higher 
price p3 if he cannot increase his chance of winning at the higher price. This implies 
x3=x4. In the same context, we can conclude I(p2)=I(p3)=I(p4). 
         Using this equality, the first two terms in the left-hand side of the above equation 
vanish and I(p4) in the third term can be replaced by I(p2).  
         Therefore, we get:  
                                                 
         35 Nautz provides more detailed discussion for this argument. See Nautz(1995) p304. 
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(21) 
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         Since  )()( 5222352253 xxpppxxpxp −−−=−   and )()( 6555665566 xxpppxxpxp −−−=− , if 
we rewrite the above equation using general notations of the observed bids, 
}{ 21 ikLikik xxx >⋅⋅⋅>> and }{ 21 ikLikik ppp <⋅⋅⋅<< with letting p3-p2 be 
∆p, then we can finally get:            
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         Note that this is entirely expressed by the observed bids, (pkm, xkm), (pkm-1, xkm-1), 
and price increment, ∆p.   
         If we assume that the marginal valuation is a step function same as before, then 
the integrals in Akm and Bkm can be evaluated and these terms become: 
                    )})()({()( 1+−−∂
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         After considering the boundary conditions, we can have a recursive set of L 
linear equations similar to the case of multiple price auction.  
         The boundary condition for the bid with the lowest price (pk1,xk1) :  
         Using xkl=x0,  p0=0 and I(p0)=0,  we get:   
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         Next, the boundary condition for the bid with the highest price (pkL,xkL) :  
         Using  the implied bid for price pkL+1, xkL+1=0, we get: 
(24)
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4.4 Comparison of FOCs Between the Continuous and the Discrete Case 
 
         Now, let’s compare the discrete version of FOCs with the continuous case. We 
will write down the FOCs again. The FOCs in the continuous case are given by:  
         multiple price auction: 
))(,(
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         single price auction: )(
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         The FOCs in the discrete case are as followings: 
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         multiple price auction:  
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         single price auction :  
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                  where Akm and Bkm are as defined in the previous section 
         If we ignore the correction terms of Akm and Bkm, we can see that the both FOCs 
in discrete case are naturally analogous to those in the continuous case.    
         In the next CHAPTER, when I calculate the marginal valuations of bidders that 
correspond to each price-quantity pair submitted, I will try to test all three types of 
FOCs, which are the continuous version, the discrete version without the correction 
terms and the discrete version with the correction terms.  
         The reason for testing the continuous version of FOCs is to see how much 
difference the results would yield when we simply assume the continuous strategy 
space despite the discrete strategy space nature of the real auction environment. This 
attempt may give us the chance to verify Fabra, et al.(2004)’s argument which pointed 
out the possibility that the continuous bid function and the discrete bid function may 
yield different outcomes. 
         The purpose of implementing both the discrete version without the correction 
terms and that with the correction terms is to check the effect of correction terms. 
Hortaçsu(2002) who performed the structural estimation for multiple price auction in 
the Turkish Treasury auction market, found that the correction terms derived in the 
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discrete case were negligible in almost all instances. Hence he argued that in most 
practical settings where the quantity of objects for sale are very large, the FOC without 
correction term can be used as the estimating equation without much loss of accuracy. 
I will try to verify if this conjecture is valid for the Korean Treasury auction and the 
single price auctions.      
         Regarding the FOCs derived up to now, I should note that there might be another 
question about the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium bid functions. In fact, many 
researchers have pointed out the possibility of multiple equilibria, but the general and 
formal works for this matter have not been found yet.36 However, as Hortaçsu (2002) 
addressed, regardless of which equilibrium is selected among possible equilibria, the 
equilibrium bid functions must obey the FOCs derived.   
     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
         36  Regarding the uniqueness of equilibrium in multiunit auction, Ausubel and Crampton (2002) 
mentioned that “In Particular we know from Wilson (1979) and subsequent papers that when the items 
are infinitely divisible, a vast multiplicity of equilibria is probably inherent to the uniform price auction 
and, in any case, the calculation of equilibria may be difficult.” On the other hand, as for the multiple 
price auction, Hortaçsu (2002) said that “…whether a given set of model primitives(the vector of 
marginal valuation functions and joint distribution of signals) leads to a unique set of equilibrium bid 
functions. Unlike the independent private value first-price auction, there are no results regarding the 
uniqueness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a discriminatory auction.”   
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
5.1 Nonparametric Identification 
 
         As pointed out in the literature surveys, I have to acknowledge that the “Policy 
Experimental Approach” has a limit when it comes to analyze the interaction of the 
bidders’ strategic behaviors which get inevitably involved in the auction game, and 
affects the outcome of the revenue. Therefore this paper will basically pursue the 
“Structural Model Approach” instead of the “Policy Experiment”.37 
         Regarding the identification problem of the structural model estimation, Guerre 
et al. (2000)38 solved the identification problem for the first price single-unit auction 
with the PIV and symmetric bidders. Their theorem states that there exist a unique 
distribution of underlying value F(vi) such that G(bi) is the distribution of equilibrium 
                                                 
         37 However, in case of testing the underlying value structure under the environment of multi-unit or 
divisible good auction, the applicable structural model approach does not yet exist to my knowledge. 
Hence, to deal with this matter, I will utilize the idea and method suggested by the policy experiment 
approach in CHAPTER 7. 
         38 See Guerre et al. (2000) , p527-531. For the reference, the equilibrium condition is given by: 
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                  where vi: private value, bi: observed bid, I: # of bidders,  
                             G(b), g(b), F(v), f(v) : cdf and pdf of bid and value resectively, 
                              satisfying g(b)/G(b)=(1/s’(v))f(v)/F(v) and s(v)=b 
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bids if and only if (i) bids are independent and identically distributed, and (ii) the 
inverse of equilibrium strategy is strictly increasing over the support of bids. Therefore 
if one can estimate the distribution of observed bids G(bi) the distribution F(.) as well 
as bidder’s vi are identified.   
         Using the insight of Guerre et al., Hortaçsu(2002) built the identification strategy 
for the structural model estimation in the Treasury auction. 
         Note that the first order condition which was derived under private independent 
value(PIV) paradigm in CHAPTER IV is expressed entirely by the observed bid price, 
bid quantity and the distribution of market clearing price. Therefore, if we make the 
assumption that the bid functions we observe in the data are indeed generated by a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auction game, and if we can estimate the latent 
distribution of market clearing price which is uniquely determined by observed bid 
prices and bid quantities, then marginal valuations, v(q(p,ti),ti), corresponding to each 
point on the bid function, q(p,ti), can be identified.  
         To see more clearly, let us define the following distribution:39 
 
(25)           )},(),(Pr{),( ∑
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jii tpqQtpqqpG  
 
which is the probability that a demand of quantity is less than the residual supply faced 
by bidder i at price p. Observe that the distribution defined is simply the probability 
that MCP is less than p, i.e., the distribution of market clearing price, and also 
                                                 
         39 See Hortaçsu(2002)  p8~9. 
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corresponds to the distribution of bid, G(bi) in Geurre et al. (2000). Because we 
assumed that the observed bid points are satisfied with the equilibrium condition, this 
probability can be estimated for all (p,q) pairs if the joint distribution of  observed 
q(p,tj), j≠i can be estimated from the data. 
         Then, the following equalities (26)-(28) hold, and all components of the first 
order condition are identified from the data so that the marginal valuation 
corresponding to each bid point are identified.40  
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         The next step is to estimate the distribution of Gi(p,q). This can be done either 
parametrically or nonparametrically. In the case of the single unit auction, the 
parametric approach assumes that F(.) follows a specific distribution such as lognormal 
or exponential distribution so that F(.) is parameterized by a vector of unknown 
                                                 
         40  In addition, Hortaçsu(2002) emphasized the point that this identification argument did not 
assume anything about the symmetry of bidder. It implies that, in the extended model considering 
asymmetry, the structural model is also identified if the  i.i.d. assumption between and within the groups 
holds and the necessary condition doesn’t change. I will give more discussion about this in CHAPTER 
7. 
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parameters. Then it estimates the unknown parameters using a likelihood-based 
approach.41  
         For our case with PIV setting, since the residual supply that a bidder i faces is a 
function of N-1 signals, (t1,t2,…tN-1), which are random variables, we can simulate the 
gamut of residual supply curves with the assumptions on the distribution of signals and 
the mapping of the signal to bid quantities. That is, we can generate random draw of 
the N-1 element signal vector of the competing bidders from known F(t), and  we can 
evaluate N-1 equilibrium opponents’ bids corresponding to these signals. 
         However, the distribution of bidders’ signals is not observed by the researcher.  
More importantly, the differential equation characterizing the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium strategy cannot be solved explicitly in many auction models or, when this 
can be done, that the solution is highly nonlinear in the latent distribution, and the 
exact mapping from the signals to the equilibrium bid vectors is generally not available 
in a closed form. Thus the parametric approach is usually associated with many priori 
assumptions and immense computational burden. 
         For these reasons, the considerable efforts to develop non parametric estimations 
have been made to circumvent this difficulty which is resulted from the parametric 
approach. However, most of the non parametric structural model estimation analyses 
are found in the single unit auction environment42. The examples applied to the multi 
                                                 
         41 According to the survey paper by Hendricks and Paarsch (1995), the parametric approaches can 
be divided into the method of maximum likelihood proposed by Donald and Paarsch (1991) and the 
method of simulated non-linear least squares proposed by  Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995). 
         42 For example, Guerre et al. (2000), Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000, 2002).  
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unit auction environment are seldom found except for the method suggested by 
Hortaçsu (2002). 
         Therefore, I will follow the nonparametric strategy developed by Hortaçsu to 
estimate the main component of my structural model which is the distribution of the 
market clearing price. In the next section, I will introduce his strategy and discussion 
related to the asymptotic property of the estimation in detail. 
 
5.2. Resampling Method to Estimate H(.)(or I(.)) 
 
         Hortaçsu(2002) suggested the following procedure simplifying the estimation 
problem: 
1) Fix bidder i among total N bidders in auction t. 
2) From the sample of N bid vectors, draw a random sample of N-1 with replacement, 
giving equal probability of 1/N .43 
3) Construct the residual supply function generated by N-1 “resampled” bid vectors. 
4) Intersect with bidder i’s bid to find the market clearing price. 
5) Repeat B times for each bidder and generate B market clearing prices conditional 
on qi(p)  vector. 
6) Estimate H(.) by counting the frequency with which a given pk remained above the 
market clearing prices generated above. 
                                                 
         43 the number of possible cases : NN-1 
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         A set of point estimates for marginal valuations rationalizing each price-quantity 
pair observed in one auction yields perfectly competitive outcome in this auction 
where bidders reveal their true value. Aggregating these estimate across the bidders 
and finding the intersection of this aggregated schedule with total supply, we can 
calculate the market clearing price and revenue which is considered to be the  ideal 
competitive outcome in the auction.   
         The resampling procedure has definite advantages in terms of its minimal use of 
distributional assumptions, but heavily relies on the assumption that bid functions are 
i.i.d. Another practical concern with the resampling procedure is the lack of precise 
estimates in the case where the number of bidders N is small. 
         Regarding the consistency problem, Hortaçsu provided the asymptotic properties 
of the resampling estimator.(His Proposition 1)44 He suggested two kinds of properties 
for the resampling estimator. The first one is for the case when using all the auction 
data across different points of time. That is, if the bids in different auctions are 
generated from the same distribution, then as NT(number of bidders times number of 
auctions) goes to infinity, the resampling estimator ),(ˆ ik
R yp rΗ  converges to 
),( ik ypH
r  almost surely. 
         This property is basically when the auctions occur in a static environment. 
However, in the TB auction, it is plausible to expect that the economic environment 
surrounding the bidders changes from auction to auction. Because the auction data is 
almost on a monthly basis, there might be lots of uncontrollable factors between the 
                                                 
         44 See Hortacsu(2002) p12~p13 and Appendix 8.3~8.5 for related proofs. 
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auctions. Considering this, he also suggested the second property for the case when we 
use data from a single auction as following:    
 
If we use data from a single auction, that is, set T=1, but let the number of 
bidders, N, go to infinity, then ),(ˆ ikR yp
rΗ  is a consistent estimator of 
),( ik ypH
r  if E )(syr  can be estimated consistently at a rate faster than N . 
This can be done by a two step procedure in which we first compute  
),(ˆ ik
R yp rΗ  using data from a single auction, and then correct this estimate 
using an estimator of E )(syr  that uses data across auctions (hence 
convergence is at rate NT where T can be taken to infinity independent of 
N). 
 
         He noted that since the market clearing price is a statistic that aggregates bidders’ 
signals, the resampling algorithm can be interpreted as “bootstrapping” the market 
clearing price about its observed value. Thus the standard bootstrap consistency results 
suggest that, as the number of bidders in the auction increase, the distribution of the 
bootstrapped market clearing price around the realized value of the market clearing 
price is a consistent estimate of the distribution of the realized market clearing price 
about its population mean.      
         Although he pointed out the necessity of the procedure of correction to get the 
desired consistency, he showed through Monte-Carlo experiment that even without the 
above additional correction related to the convergence rate of the population mean, the 
resampling algorithm that uses data from a single auction performed quite well.    
 
 65
5.3 Estimation of Derivatives 
 
         Since Hortaçsu analyzed only multiple price auction data and estimated the 
unknown true value by using the discrete version of FOC without correction terms, he 
didn’t have to care about the estimation for the first derivatives of the MCP distribution 
function with respect to price and quantity, Hp(or Ip) and Hy(or Ix). 
         However, in my analysis to attempt to use all of the three types of FOCs which 
has been derived in the previous CHAPTER, we need to estimate the derivatives to 
completely recover the true value. 
 
5.3.1 Estimation of Hp(or Ip) 
 
         In order to utilize the continuous version of FOC directly, we have to estimate the 
first derivative of the distribution of MCP to price.45 Since each bidders bid function is 
given by a step function in our data, the residual supply constructed by the resampled 
bid vectors will also be a step function so that the resulting market clearing prices 
should lie on a finite discrete price grid. Figure 6 illustrates this situation.  
         Therefore, to get the MCPs dispersed continuously so as to estimate continuous 
type of Hp, we need to have a continuous functional form of either individual bid 
vectors or residual supply. In the case of the individual’s bid vector, there are at the 
most up to 5 steps because maximum number of bids per bidder is restricted to 5. 
                                                 
         45 Note that we don’t have to have this derivative in using discrete version of FOC 
 66
Making the bid vector be continuous may introduce new errors and result in excessive 
smoothness. Hence, I will smooth out residual supply and intersect them with 
individual step bid function. This procedure is depicted in Figure 7 and Figure 8.  
 
 
FIGURE 6. Illustration of Discrete Distribution of MCP 
 
         To obtain smooth residual supply curves, I use nonparametric kernel 
estimation for the regression function. Let the price quantity pairs on the residual 
supply be {(p1,q1), (p2,q2),…, (pK,qK)}, then the formula is given by:46 
                                                 
         46  Wolak(2003) suggested a slightly different formula, which is  ∑
=
−=
K
k
k
k h
pp
KqpRS
1
)()(   
(where, qk : bid increment at price pk, K(.) : standard normal cdf.), but I found that both ways yielded 
very similar results. In addition, as the smoothing parameter, I chose the value by ad-hoc method which 
is standatd in nonparametric structural estimation. 
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FIGURE 7. Smoothing the Residual Supply  
 
FIGURE 8. Intersection of Step Bid and Smoothed Residual Supply 
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           where K(.): standard normal kernel function,  
                      h: smoothing parameter(or bandwidth) 
         If we smooth bid functions, then we can get continuously spread MCPs. With 
these B resampled MCPs, I estimate H(p,y(p)) by the same frequency method, i.e, 
B
pypofMCPs )}(|{# ≤
.   
         To estimate Hp, we can evaluate the following amount for “small” dp: 47 
dppydppppyppdppydppHpypH cc /)}](|Pr{)}(|[Pr{/))](,())(,([ +≤−≤=+−  
However more formally, we can estimate this using nonparametric kernel estimation. 
That is, with i.i.d. data {X1,X2,…,Xn} randomly drawn form distribution F(x), pdf 
f(x)=dF/dx can be estimated nonparametrically using the following formula: 
       ∑
=
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xXK
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         Since )}(|Pr{))(,( pypp
p
pypH cp ≤∂
∂= ,i.e., the density function of 
H(p,y(p)) when y(p) is submitted, so that in our case, H(.) is corresponding to F(.), and 
Hp(.) is to f(.), our formula will be: 
 
                                                 
         47 Since H(.) is the probability distribution conditional on a certain bidder’s bid vector, the change 
in price must reflect the change in y(p). However, because our resampled MCPs have been obtained by 
intersecting a certain fixed individual bid vector, in the difference of H(.) between two price points, this 
effect is already included.  
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         where Pic ={ P1c , P2c ,…, PBc } is B MCPs which are obtained by the   
          resampling, with # of iteration B 
         Figure 9 displays the estimated Hp of bidder #29 at auction #3 by both kernel 
estimation and calculating incremental change for “small” dp. We can see the results of 
the incremental changes which are represented by x are located along the line 
estimated by the kernel function so that both methods are not much different from each 
other in a practical sense. Throughout I will use the kernel estimation results of Hp to 
recover the true value.     
 
 
FIGURE 9 − Comparison of Kernel Estimation and Calculation of Incremental 
Change of Hp 
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5.3.2 Estimation of Hy(or Ix)  
 
         Except for the cases using the continuous version of FOC and the discrete version 
of FOC without correction terms in multiple price auction, we need to estimate the first 
derivative of MCP distribution with respect to quantity, 
k
k
y
pH
∂
∂ )(
. Especially, to use 
the discrete version of FOCs with correction terms 
k
k
y
pH
∂
∂ − )( 1  also need to be 
estimated. 48   
         To estimate this, I use the fact that the distribution of MCP can be represented as 
the probability distribution of the sum of N-1 bid quantities which are i.i.d. random 
variables. That is: 
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In words, given price point pk  the probability that MCP is less than or equal to this 
price is same as the probability that sum of the competitors’ bid amount at pk is less 
than or equal to total supply minus i’s  own bid amount at pk. 
         Let the residual supply faced by bidder i at price pk be: 
         ∑
≠
−=
N
ij
kjk pyQpRS )()( .  
         Then we can rewrite the distribution of MCP:  
                                                 
         48 
k
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y
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∂
∂ )( can be interpreted by the shift in the distribution of MCP due to a change in y(p). 
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      Let Fi(.,yi(p)), f(.) denote the cdf and the pdf of RS(p) conditional on yi(p), then 
H(p,y(p))=1- Fi(.,yi(p)).  
       Hence, 
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Since we can calculate 5000 residual supply amount at each price from our 5000 
resampled residual supply functions, we can estimate –f(RS) at fixed price point by the 
kernel estimation. 
     The formula is given by: 
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     Alternatively, by the same way as the case of Hp we can calculate 
y
pyyHpyH kk
∆
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 for “small” ∆y after obtaining )|( kppyH =  by 
counting the frequency with which a given y remained below the residual supplies at 
the given price pk.  
         Figure 10 displays the estimated Hy49 of bidder #30 at auction #27 by both ways 
suggested above. I show examples at three different price levels where this bidder 
placed a bid quantity. In calculating incremental change I used minimum bid amount 
as “small” ∆y. We can see the results from incremental change are distributed along 
                                                 
         49 More precisely, according to my notation, this is Ix.  
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the line estimated by kernel function which is as similar as Hp case. Henceforth I will 
use the result of kernel estimation from the next section on. 
         We can also estimate 
k
k
y
pH
∂
∂ − )( 1 by the same way as that used in estimating 
k
k
y
pH
∂
∂ )(
, that is, either by calculating [H(Pk-1|yk)-H(Pk-1|yk+dy)]/dy or by doing kernel 
estimation for the residual supplies at price Pk-1 . 
         With the estimates of MCP distribution and its derivatives evaluated at the 
specific point of bid price and quantity we can compute the shading amount and the 
unknown true value. 
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          1)  pk=10000KW 
 
          2)  pk=10002.7KW 
 
          3)  pk=9997.3KW 
 
FIGURE 10. Comparison of Kernel Estimation and Calculation of Incremental 
Change of Ix
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CHAPTER VI 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
6.1  Revenue Comparison Method  
 
         The main purpose of this paper is to establish a revenue ranking between the two 
auction formats for selling TB. As I pointed out in CHAPTER V, underlying economic 
environment varies from auction to auction and there are many uncontrollable factors 
which can affect the auction outcome. Therefore, I will perform the empirical work 
auction by auction, without pooling the whole data or the data falling into a certain 
period when the same auction format was used.  
         To compare the revenues in this auction by auction strategy, the counterfactual 
comparison is the most effective way to do that. However, both auction formats 
produce certain types of “demand reduction” or “bid shading”, but we do not have any 
explicit functional form which can relate optimal bidding in the multiple price auction 
to that of the single price auction. Hence we can never directly estimate the outcome of 
the single price auction to that in which the multiple price auction format was 
implemented or vice versa. This means that direct counterfactual comparison is not 
possible in this analysis.  
         Therefore, I will attempt to do “indirect” counterfactual comparison using the 
outcome of the Vickery auction which can be estimated once we recover true 
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valuations. To see why this idea is reasonable, we need to understand the working 
procedure of the Vickery auction.50   
         Same as the other two conventional auction formats, bidders in the Vickery 
auction also simultaneously and independently submit sealed bids consisting of 
demand functions to the auctioneer. The auctioneer apportions units to the highest 
bidders but does not assign payment according to the single price nor the multiple price 
formula. Instead, the payment rule is that a bidder who wins the K items pays the 
amount of the kth highest rejected bid other than his own for the kth item(k=1,…,K) in 
the case of M indivisible items. In the case of a perfectly divisible items, the payment, 
Pi of bidder i who wins yi(pc) is given by: 
       ∫ − −−−= cipp iccii drryppyP )}(1{)(  
        where pc : the market clearing price 
                   p-i : the market clearing price if bidder i had been absent from the  
                          auction 
                   y-i(.) : the aggregate demand of all other bidders  
 
         The payment of bidder i, Pi, in the Vickery auction is depicted in Figure 11. It is 
the area under the {1-y-i(p)} curve, from 0 to yi(pc), which is shaded in the figure.  
         Note that each bidder’s payment is independent of his own bids conditional on 
the number of units won. Therefore, in the Vickery auction bidders do not have any 
incentive for bid reduction and consequently truth-telling is an equilibrium which 
makes the Vickery auction especially conducive to efficiency. 
                                                 
         50 See Ausubel (1997) 
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FIGURE 11. Payment Rule in Vickery Auction 
 
         In our analysis, if the true valuations corresponding to observed bid points are 
estimated, the intersection of the aggregate true valuation schedule and total supply 
yields the perfectly competitive MCP of this auction (denoted by MCPv), in which 
bidders reveal their true valuation and the rectangle formed by the intersection of these 
two schedule yields an upper bound to the revenue from the Vickery auction. 
Therefore, we can perform “indirect” counterfactual revenue comparison by comparing 
this upper bound of the revenue in the Vickery auction(denoted by Rv) to the actual 
revenues from two conventional auction formats(denoted by Ra).  
         Figure 12 illustrates the way of counterfactual comparison for the two auction 
formats. In the figure, note that the upper bound of the revenue in the Vickery auction 
p 
q 
1-y-i(p) 
yi(p) 
 pc 
 
p-i 
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is always larger than the actual revenue in single price auction, while one may be 
larger or smaller than the other in the multiple price auction.  
         To see the amount of the revenue change, I calculated a revenue loss for each 
auction by percentage terms (Ra-Rv)/Rv. Again, note that the revenue loss in the single 
price auction is always negative but that in the multiple price auction may be positive 
or negative. Thus, if the revenue loss in the multiple price auction is significantly 
positive, then we can conclude that the multiple price auction format is superior to the 
single price auction in terms of revenue.  
 
 
FIGURE 12. Counterfactual Comparison for Two Auction Formats 
 
         As a supplementary indicator, I will also check the change in MCP. We know 
that regardless of the auction format bid shading exists, but the degree of bid reduction 
along the price grid may be different according to the auction format. The theoretical 
value 
bid 
Supply 
* shaded area : Ra / area surrounded dashed line : Rv 
MCPv 
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prediction is that the bid reduction is higher as the bid price is larger in the multiple 
price auction but that at lower bid prices, it is larger in the single price auction. If 
MCPv of the single price auction is quite larger than that of the multiple price auction, 
then the above conjecture may be supported. This can be an indicator of whether 
revenue comparison would be meaningful. If there is not a significant difference of 
MCP in the multiple price auction, then the revenue loss in the multiple price auction is 
more likely to be positive so that the multiple price auction may yield more revenue 
than the single price auction. 
 
6.2  Multiple Price Auction  
 
         In order to show the process more clearly, I will present the results for the third 
auction in my data of Nov. 15, 1999. In this auction there were 28 bidders(14 banks 
and  14 security houses) for what amounted to 1184.9 billion KW – about 10 billion 
U.S. dollars.  A total of 108 bids were submitted and 56 bids(52%) were successful. 
The cutoff yield was 8.37%. When I converted the yield to price by setting this cutoff 
yield to be 10000 KW, the range of bid prices were from 9971.14 KW to 10013.15 
KW in which the number of price grids is 17. To demonstrate bidder-level procedure, I 
will focus on bidder #29, who submitted 5 price-quantity pairs totaling to a demand of 
29 billion KW.    
         As discussed in section 5.2, I generated a random drawing of 27 bid vectors from 
the sample of 28 bid vectors with replacement, giving equal probability of 1/28 to each 
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bid vector in the original sample. I performed 5000 iterations of this resampling 
procedure to generate 5000×27 “resampled” bid vectors and 5000 residual supply 
curves. By intersecting these 5000 residual supply curves with bidder #29’s bid 
function I found 5000 market clearing prices. From these 5000 resampled market 
clearing prices, I constructed the distribution of market clearing price by counting the 
frequency with which a given price level remained above the market clearing prices. 
         Figure 13 shows the probability distribution of market clearing price conditional 
on bidder #29’s bid vector. This probability distribution is a discrete version of cdf 
when using the step functional bid vector and the step functional residual supplies. I 
marked bidder #29’s bid points with a star(x). We see that all bids except for one at the 
lowest price lie within the support of market clearing price distribution.  
 
 
FIGURE 13. Bidder #29’s Bids and H(p,y(p)) 
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         Figure 14 displays the continuous version of H(.) and Hp(.) which are depicted by 
a solid line and dotted line with the discrete version of H(.) in one graph. Note that the 
continuous version is the outcome from the intersection of step functional bid vectors 
and kernel smoothed residual supply curves. In this auction, the continuous version of 
H(.) is a little higher than the discrete version of that at a certain price.   
 
 
FIGURE 14. Discrete Version of H(.) and Continuous Version of H(.) & Hp(.) 
 
         In order to apply the discrete FOCs with correction terms, we also need the 
estimates of Hy. Figure 15 displays the estimation results of Hy at three different price 
levels. Here, I depict only results from the kernel estimation.   
         Using these market clearing price distribution and FOCs of multiple price auction, 
I can recover the marginal valuations of bidder #29 that correspond to his own price-
quantity pairs submitted.  
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          1)  pk=10000KW 
 
          2)  pk=10002.6KW 
 
          3)  pk=9997.4KW 
 
FIGURE 15. Kernel Estimation of Hy 
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         Table 3 shows the estimated marginal valuations of bidder #29. In this table, I 
present all the results from the three kinds of FOCs. We see that there is not much 
difference between the two discrete versions of FOCs, but the version with the 
correction terms yields a little higher valuation than that without the correction terms. 
This is due to the fact that the sign of the whole correction terms is positive. 
 
TABLE 3 − Marginal Valuation of Bidder #29 
Marginal Valuation 
Bid price Quantity Dis. FOC 
 w/o correct 
Dis. FOC 
 w/ correct 
  
(SEjack) 
Cont. FOC   
(SEjack)
10005.26 0.063 10058.11 10058.32 708.12 - -
10002.63 0.118 10003.13 10003.19 1.15 10043.22 1333.4
10000.00 0.177 10000.19 10000.27 0.36 10001.35 1.69
9997.37 0.211 9997.45 9997.60 0.45 9998.02 0.36
9994.74 0.245 - - - 9995.26 0.87
 
         In addition, the biggest difference between the discrete and continuous FOCs 
occurs at the price of 10002.63 KW. Quite a big shading at this price in the continuous 
case is due to a relatively bigger probability of H(.) and smaller Hp than the discrete 
case which might be related to the fact that overall distribution of MCP in the 
continuous case is shifted to left compared to that of the discrete case.  
         In the case of the discrete version of FOCs, I cannot recover the marginal value 
for the lowest bid price. This is either because I assumed H(p0)=0, for p0<pk1(the 
lowest observed bid price) so that )( 11−kpH  in the numerator of FOC becomes zero or 
because at sufficiently lower price, as we saw in the shape of the distribution of MCP, 
usually )()( 1−− kk pHpH  in the denominator of FOC takes zero value so as to make it 
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impossible to get the value. Similarly, in the case of the continuous version of FOCs, at 
the highest bid price, we cannot recover the true value because Hp, denominator, might 
be zero at this price. 
         Regarding the efficiency measure for our estimated valuation, it is usually known 
to be difficult to calculate the standard error for the resampling method because both 
the consistency proof for valuation estimates does not yield the asymptotic formula for 
this variance and it is a non-linear function in H(.).51  
         Thus, I use the “jackknife to bootstrap” method suggested by Efron(1992) to 
compute the standard errors for my estimates of the marginal valuation. He suggested a 
two step methodology to compute the “jackknife to bootstrap” standard error for the 
bootstrap statistic )(ˆ xγ . 52   First, we need to compute the jackknife influence 
function(denoted by }ˆ{γiu ) by calculating the deleted point values, )(ˆˆ )()( ii xγγ =  
where x(i) is the data set remaining after deletion of the ith data point. The estimate of 
the jackknife influence function, }ˆ{~ γiu , is given by: 
                   )ˆ)(1(}ˆ{~ )(() ii nu γγγ −−=  
                         where, ∑≡
i
i n/ˆ )(() γγ  
                                                 
         51 See Hortcsu(2002) p41. 
         52 See Efron(1992) pp88-90. According to Efron’s notation, this bootstrap statistic is result from 
this setting: Let a random variable T(x, F) be a function of x and F. Let  [T(X, F)] indicate the 
probability distribution of T(X, F), for X={X1,…,Xn}, an i,i,d sample from F, and let Φ[T(X,F)] be some 
functional of this distribution. Finally set γ(F)≡ Φ[T(X,F)] , and define the bootstrap statistic 
)ˆ()(ˆ Fx γγ ≡ , where Fˆ  is the empirical probability distribution. With this definition, the bootstrap 
statistic is equivalent to )]ˆ,([)(ˆ * FxTx φγ ≡ . 
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         Then the estimate of the “jackknife to bootstrap” standard error, }ˆ{γjackse , is: 
                ∑ −=
i
ijack nnues
2/12 )]1(/}{~[}ˆ{~ γγ  
         It is known that usually }ˆ{}ˆ{~ γγ ii uu →  and }ˆ{}ˆ{~ γγ jackjack sees →  as number of 
iteration(B) goes to infinity.  
         If we carefully look at the above algorithm, we can find that the main factors for 
our setting in estimating bidders’ valuation have a one to one relationship with those of 
Efron’s setting. That is, X→y(p), F→underlying distribution of signal or residual 
supply, T(x, F)→market clearing price, [ T(x, F)]→distribution of market clearing 
price, H(.),  Φ[T(X,F)]= )(ˆ xγ →estimated valuation. Therefore, we can calculate the 
“jackknife to bootstrap” standard error for our valuation estimates using the same 
formula as Efron’s.  
         Let the estimate for the marginal valuation of bidder i for yik units of TB be 
)(ˆ ikyv  and let the bootstrap estimate over a set of resamples that do not contain the i’s 
bid vector be )(ˆ )( iki yv . Then, the estimate of jackknife influence function, )}(ˆ{~ iki yvu , 
and estimate of “jackknife to bootstrap” standard error, )}(ˆ{~ ikjack yves  are: 
                   ))(ˆ)(1()}(ˆ{~ )(() ikiiki yvvnyvu −−=  
                         where, ∑≡
i
iki nyvv /)(ˆ )(()  
                  ∑ −=
i
ikiikjack nnyvuyves
2/12 )]1(/)}(ˆ{~[)}(ˆ{~  
                                         2/12)(()
2 ])1(/)(ˆ()1[( ∑ −−−=
i
iki nnyvvn  
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                                         2/12)(() ]}))(ˆ({
1[ ∑ −−=
i
iki yvvn
n 53 
         In Table 3, I reported the sejack of recovered marginal valuations for bidder #29. 
As the shading amount is quite larger, the standard errors also tend to be larger. 
         There is one practical concern that we must consider to aggregate the true 
marginal valuations. As we have seen before, there are some points where we cannot 
recover the true value, and therefore, need to use some values for these missing values 
for a more complete revenue comparison.  
         Since it is extremely hard to know the exact form of true value function in the 
multi-unit auction environment, I will try to circumvent this problem by setting some 
restrictions on the valuation structure. One restriction is that the valuation function is 
weakly decreasing to the quantity, and the other is that at a lower price range where the 
losing bids are located, bidders are assumed to not shade.  
         Hence if I fail to recover their true value for the winning bid, I will assign 
max(pk, vk-1) at that point, where pk is the bid price, and vk-1 is the recovered value at the 
next lower bid price. Also, if the missing value occurred at a losing bid, I will just 
assign its bid price as its true value. 
         Figure 16 depicts the marginal valuation curve of bidder #29 after filling in the 
missing values according to the steps described above. I now display the case of the 
                                                 
         53 Hortcsu(2002) also calculated “jackknife to bootstrap” standard error for his marginal valuation, 
but he used 
1−N
N  in his formula.    
 86
continuous version of FOC and the case of discrete version of FOC with the correction 
terms. 
 
 
FIGURE 16. Marginal Valuation Curve of Bidder #29 
 
         We see that the marginal value for the higher bid is larger which implies that 
bidders may value initial units very highly. In addition, the point estimates of the 
marginal value seem to decline with quantity. 
         I repeat this analysis for every bidder in this auction. This gives me 28 bidders’ 
point estimates of their marginal valuations rationalizing each price quantity pair 
observed in this auction. I aggregate these estimated marginal valuations across bidders, 
and find the intersection of this aggregate schedule with the total supply which is 
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normalized to 1. This yields the (hypothetical) Vickery auction outcome, in which 
bidders reveal their true marginal valuations.   
         Figure 17 displays the aggregate bid function and the estimated aggregate 
marginal valuation functions which are resulting from the continuous FOC and the 
discrete FOC with the correction terms.  
 
 
FIGURE 17. Aggregate Bid Function and Aggregate Value Function 
 
         To see the difference more clearly between them around the market clearing 
price, I have narrowed down the scale of the two axes in Figure 18.  
         From Figure 18, we can see that the aggregate marginal values lie above the 
actual bid price at each bid amount point up to the point where the aggregate bid 
amount exceeds one. We also see that at the equilibrium where the aggregate schedules 
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meet the vertical line which is drawn at the point where the quantity equals to one, the 
market clearing price of the marginal value schedule (MCPv) is slightly higher than the 
actual market clearing price which is normalized to 10000.00KW. The MCPv of the 
continuous FOC case is 10002.04 KW while that of the discrete FOC with correction 
terms is 10000.27. In the discrete case, the MCPv is almost same as the actual market 
clearing price. 
 
 
FIGURE 18. Zoom in Aggregate Bid Function and Aggregate Value Function 
 
         As depicted in Figure 12, the revenue of the multiple price auction is given by the 
area under the aggregate schedule up to the total supply. The upper bound to the 
Vickery auction revenue, Rv, would be 987.62 million US dollar in the continuous case 
and 987.44 million US dollar in the discrete case as opposed to 987.67 million US 
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dollar of the actual revenue. The revenue loss is 0.005% and 0.023% which means that 
the Vickery auction causes a revenue loss at this auction.  
         I performed the same procedure for the other nine 3-year TB auctions. Table 4 
and Table 5 summarize the results for every multiple price auctions. 
 
TABLE 4 − Results of Multiple Price Auctions : MCPv 
Date Con. FOC Dis. FOC (w/ correction)  
Dis. FOC 
(w/o correction)  
9/13/1999 10007.44 10002.59 10001.91
10/11/1999 10001.31 10000.00 10000.00
11/15/1999 10002.04 10000.27 10000.11
1/17/2000 10000.60 10000.00 10000.00
2/14/2000 10000.36 10000.00 10000.00
3/13/2000 10000.76 10000.00 10000.00
4/10/2000 10000.80 10000.00 10000.00
5/8/2000 10001.18 10000.00 10000.00
6/12/2000 10004.05 10000.00 10002.62
7/10/2000 10001.79 10000.02 10002.65
          * Actual market clearing price are normalized to 10000 KW 
 
TABLE 5 − Results of Multiple Price Auctions : Revenue 
Vickery Revenue 
(Rv, $mill) 
Revenue loss(%) 
(=[Ra-Rv]/Rv) Date 
Actual 
Revenue 
(Ra, $mill) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
9/13/1999 1001.259 1000.74 1000.26 1000.19 0.051 0.100 0.107
10/11/1999 1131.546 1131.31 1131.17 1131.17 0.020 0.033 0.033
11/15/1999 987.672 987.62 987.44 987.43 0.005 0.023 0.025
1/17/2000 637.333 637.12 637.08 637.08 0.033 0.039 0.039
2/14/2000 1023.630 1023.37 1023.33 1023.33 0.025 0.029 0.029
3/13/2000 553.402 553.29 553.25 553.25 0.020 0.027 0.027
4/10/2000 700.042 699.97 699.92 699.92 0.010 0.018 0.018
5/8/2000 635.111 635.08 635.00 635.00 0.006 0.017 0.017
6/12/2000 500.408 500.20 500.00 500.13 0.041 0.082 0.055
7/10/2000 488.585 488.42 488.33 488.46 0.034 0.051 0.025
 (1) Continuous FOC / (2) Discrete FOC w/correction terms / (3) Discrete FOC w/o correction terms 
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         From Table 4, except for the 1st and the last auction, the MCPv is not quite 
different from the actual market clearing price in the multiple price auction. It can be 
interpreted that in the multiple price auction, there is no strong incentive to shade bids 
around MCP. In Table 5, we can see that all revenue losses are positive numbers which 
suggests that the multiple price auction outperforms the Vickery auction in terms of 
revenue. 
         Since the revenue losses seem to be very small, one might be wondering whether 
the amount of revenue loss calculated above is significant or not. In fact, the observed 
bids and estimated marginal valuations are random variables so that the auction 
revenue is also a random variable. Therefore, if we can construct a confidence interval 
for the difference between Rv and Ra, the question in regards to the significance of the 
revenue loss may be answered. I will attempt to do that by the  bootstrap procedure. 
         First, I constructed 10,000 resamples of the pair of actual bids and estimated 
marginal valuations for each auction. In each resample there are Nt actual bid vectors 
and Nt marginal valuations vectors drawn randomly from the original set of bids and 
the set of estimated marginal valuations vectors respectively. 
         With these resamples, I calculated the market clearing price and revenue for each 
pair of resample and obtained 10,000 differences of Rv and Ra. The mean value of 
these resampled revenue difference gives us the mean estimates of ex-ante revenue 
difference. We can also construct the confidence interval for the revenue difference. 
After sorting these 10,000 differences in an ascending order, we can obtain the 95% 
bootstrap confidence interval by finding the 2.5% percentile and 97.5% percentile. 
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         To test whether the revenue difference is significant is the same as to test H0 : 
Ra-Rv=0. Hence if zero lies within this 95% interval we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, but if not, we can conclude that the revenue difference is significantly 
different from zero. Table 6 summarizes the test result.   
 
TABLE 6 − Test for Revenue Difference(Ho:Ra-Rv=0) 
Date Con. FOC Dis. FOC (w/ correction)  
Dis. FOC 
(w/o correction)  
9/13/1999 no reject no reject Reject 
10/11/1999 no reject reject Reject 
11/15/1999 no reject reject Reject 
1/17/2000 no reject reject Reject 
2/14/2000 reject reject Reject 
3/13/2000 no reject reject reject 
4/10/2000 no reject reject reject 
5/8/2000 reject reject reject 
6/12/2000 no reject reject reject 
7/10/2000 no reject reject reject 
 
         From Table 6, the amounts of ex-post difference which we obtained, turn out to 
be significant at almost of all auctions in the discrete case. 
 
6.3 Single Price Auction  
 
         Similar to the previous section, I will start by showing the results for one of the 
single price auctions which was held on January 7, 2002(auction code #27). In this 
auction there were 27 bidders (11 banks and 16 security houses) for what amounted to 
1,200 billion Korean won – about 10 billion U.S. dollars.  A total of 118 bids were 
 92
submitted, and 37% of the bids were successful. The cutoff yield was 6.10%. The 
range of bid prices were from 9953.83 KW to 10032.73 KW in which the number of 
price grids is 30.  
         I will focus on bidder #30 who submitted 5 price-quantity pairs totaling a demand 
of 10% of the total supply. Using the same resampling procedure as before, I 
constructed 5000 residual supply curves and 5,000 resampled market clearing prices. 
With this resample, I estimated the distribution of market clearing price. Figure 19 
shows the distribution of the market clearing price conditional on bidder #30’s bid 
vector. 
   
 
FIGURE 19. The Distribution of MCP with Bidder #30’s Bid Vector 
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         In Figure 19, the distribution of MCP for the discrete case is depicted by a bar-
shape and that of the continuous case is shown by a solid and dotted line. In this 
auction, the distribution of the continuous case is slightly shifted to the right compared 
to that of the discrete case. In the case of the derivative of I(.) with respect to quantity, 
Ix, refer to the results depicted in Figure 10.         
         I calculated the marginal valuations for bidder #30 corresponding to each price-
quantity pair submitted using the first-order conditions derived in section 4.3. Table 7 
summarizes the true valuations of bidder #30 and their standard error.  
 
TABLE 7 − Marginal Valuation of Bidder #30 
Marginal Valuation 
Bid price Quantity Dis. FOC 
 w/o correct 
Dis. FOC 
 w/ correct 
  
(SEjack) 
Cont. FOC   
(SEjack)
10005.44 0.008 10005.47 10005.60 0.15 10005.45 0.04
10002.72 0.016 10002.76 10002.78 0.03 10002.92 0.02
9994.55 0.033 9997.60 9999.41 23.21 9994.91 0.14
9991.83 0.066 - - - - -
9989.12 0.100 - - - - -
 
         We cannot recover the true value for the last lowest two bids because 
)()( 1−− kk pIpI  or Ix are zero. 
         After filling in the missing values using the method suggested in the previous 
section, the valuation function of bidder #30 is drawn in Figure 20.  
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FIGURE 20. Marginal Valuation Curve of Bidder #30 
 
         I repeated this analysis for every bidder in this auction. Then, I aggregated these 
estimated marginal valuations across the bidders, and found the intersection of the 
aggregate schedule with total supply.  
         This yields the perfectly competitive outcome for this auction, in which bidders 
reveal their true marginal valuations under the single price auction. Figure 21 depicts 
the aggregate bid and aggregate marginal valuations schedule and Figure 22 shows the 
difference around MCP more closely.  
         In this auction, the MCPv of the continuous FOC case is 10000.51 KW while that 
of the discrete FOC with correction terms is 10002.04. In the continuous case, the 
MCPv is almost the same as the actual market clearing price. 
 
 95
 
FIGURE 21. Aggregate Bid and Aggregate Valuation Schedule 
 
 
FIGURE 22. Zoom in Aggregate Bid and Aggregate Valuation 
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         As depicted in Figure 12, the revenue for the single price auction is given by the 
rectangle formed by the intersection of the aggregate schedule and total supply. The 
upper bound of the Vickery auction revenue, Rv, would be 1000.05 million US dollar 
in the continuous case and 1000.20 million US dollar in the discrete case as opposed to 
1000.00 million US dollar of actual revenue. The revenue losses are -0.005% and -
0.020% respectively which means that the revenue for the single price auction is less 
than that of the Vickery auction.  
         I performed the same procedure for the other 19 single price auctions. Table 8 
and Table 9 summarize the results for every auction. 
 
TABLE 8 − Results of Single Price Auctions : MCPv 
Date Con. FOC 
Dis. FOC 
(w/ correction) 
Dis. FOC 
(w/o correction) 
8/14/2000 10000.23 10003.57 10001.85 
9/18/2000 10001.16 10000.00 10000.93 
10/9/2000 10000.35 10002.61 10002.35 
11/13/2000 10000.10 10002.17 10000.29 
1/8/2001 10000.21 10002.73 10003.21 
2/5/2001 10000.83 10002.75 10002.75 
3/12/2001 10000.20 10002.72 10002.75 
4/2/2001 10000.84 10002.70 10004.07 
5/7/2001 10000.87 10002.72 10004.45 
6/4/2001 10003.15 10002.70 10002.74 
7/2/2001 10001.16 10002.51 10002.73 
8/6/2001 10002.06 10002.30 10002.77 
9/3/2001 10000.39 10000.79 10002.78 
10/8/2001 10000.31 10002.16 10001.18 
11/7/2001 10000.30 10000.00 10001.26 
12/3/2001 10000.66 10001.62 10001.20 
1/7/2002 10000.51 10002.04 10002.98 
2/4/2002 10000.78 10002.02 10002.54 
3/4/2002 10000.84 10003.37 10002.80 
4/1/2002 10000.41 10002.73 10002.71 
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TABLE 9 − Results of Single Price Auctions : Revenue 
Vickery Revenue 
(Rv, $mill) 
Revenue loss(%) 
(=[Ra-Rv]/Rv) Date 
Actual 
Revenue 
(Ra, $mill) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
8/14/2000 500.000 500.01 500.18 500.09 -0.002 -0.036 -0.019
9/18/2000 750.000 750.09 750.00 750.07 -0.012 0.000 -0.009
10/9/2000 750.000 750.03 750.20 750.18 -0.004 -0.026 -0.023
11/13/2000 791.667 791.67 791.84 791.69 -0.001 -0.022 -0.003
1/8/2001 625.000 625.01 625.17 625.20 -0.002 -0.027 -0.032
2/5/2001 641.667 641.72 641.84 641.84 -0.008 -0.028 -0.028
3/12/2001 416.667 416.68 416.78 416.78 -0.002 -0.027 -0.027
4/2/2001 666.667 666.72 666.85 666.94 -0.008 -0.027 -0.041
5/7/2001 500.000 500.04 500.14 500.22 -0.009 -0.027 -0.045
6/4/2001 333.333 333.44 333.42 333.42 -0.032 -0.027 -0.027
7/2/2001 333.333 333.37 333.42 333.42 -0.012 -0.025 -0.027
8/6/2001 583.333 583.45 583.47 583.50 -0.021 -0.023 -0.028
9/3/2001 708.333 708.36 708.39 708.53 -0.004 -0.008 -0.028
10/8/2001 741.667 741.69 741.83 741.75 -0.003 -0.022 -0.012
11/7/2001 625.000 625.02 625.00 625.08 -0.003 0.000 -0.013
12/3/2001 925.000 925.06 925.15 925.11 -0.007 -0.016 -0.012
1/7/2002 1000.000 1000.05 1000.20 1000.30 -0.005 -0.020 -0.030
2/4/2002 333.333 333.36 333.40 333.42 -0.008 -0.020 -0.025
3/4/2002 416.667 416.70 416.81 416.78 -0.008 -0.034 -0.028
4/1/2002 475.000 475.02 475.13 475.13 -0.004 -0.027 -0.027
(1): Continuous FOC / (2): Discrete FOC w/correction terms / (3): Discrete FOC w/o correction terms 
 
         I also tested whether the revenue difference is significantly different from zero 
using the bootstrap procedure. I can reject the null hypothesis in the continuous case 
and the discrete case without correction terms, but I cannot in the discrete case with 
correction terms.   
         Compared to the result for the multiple price auction, we can see that the MCPv 
is higher than in the multiple price auction. This suggest that there is more of a shading 
incentive in the bids around the market clearing price.  
           In the case of the revenue loss rates, as I pointed out in the section 6.1, the signs 
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for them are negative and their absolute sizes are not much different from that of the 
multiple price auction. Since most of them are very small values we need to check the 
significance of those differences. Table 10 summarizes these test results. Interestingly, 
the result of the discrete FOC case shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
equivalence of Rv and Ra in the lots of the auctions even though the results of the 
continuous FOC case is ambiguous. This result implies that the revenue from the single 
price auction is likely to be indifferent from the upper bound of revenue from the 
Vickery auction.    
 
TABLE 10 − Test for Revenue Difference(Ho:Ra-Rv=0) 
Date Con. FOC 
Dis. FOC 
(w/ correction) 
Dis. FOC 
(w/o correction) 
8/14/2000 Reject No reject Reject 
9/18/2000 Reject No reject No reject 
10/9/2000 Reject No reject Reject 
11/13/2000 Reject reject Reject 
1/8/2001 Reject No reject Reject 
2/5/2001 Reject No reject No reject 
3/12/2001 Reject No reject No reject 
4/2/2001 No reject No reject No reject 
5/7/2001 Reject No reject Reject 
6/4/2001 Reject No reject No reject 
7/2/2001 No reject No reject No reject 
8/6/2001 No reject No reject Reject 
9/3/2001 No reject No reject Reject 
10/8/2001 Reject No reject No reject 
11/7/2001 No reject No reject Reject 
12/3/2001 Reject No reject No reject 
1/7/2002 Reject No reject Reject 
2/4/2002 Reject No reject Reject 
3/4/2002 Reject No reject No reject 
4/1/2002 Reject reject no reject 
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6.4 Conclusion in Revenue Ranking 
 
         To see the difference in MCPv and the revenue loss between the two auction 
formats more clearly, I calculated the mean values which are summarized in Table 11. 
Since the total supply in an auction varies greatly from 400 billion KW to 1357 billion 
KW during the sample period, I divided the auctions to where the total supply is over 
800 bill KW and those below 800 bill KW, and calculated the mean for each group 
considering the possible effects of the amount of total supply on the outcomes.  
 
TABLE 11 − Mean Value of MCPv and %Revenue Ross 
  Format Con. FOC Dis. FOC (w/ correction) 
Dis. FOC 
(w/o correction) 
>800 multi(5) 10002.39 10000.57 10000.40
 single(12) 10000.54 10001.76 10001.97
<800 multi(5) 10001.67 10000.00 10001.05
 single(8) 10000.92 10002.51 10002.72
Total Multi(10) 10002.03 10000.29 10000.73
MCPv 
 Single(20) 10000.77 10002.21 10002.42
>800 multi(5) 0.023 0.041 0.042
 single(12) -0.005 -0.018 -0.020
<800 multi(5) 0.027 0.043 0.033
 single(8) -0.009 -0.025 -0.027
total Multi(10) 0.025 0.042 0.038
Revenue 
Loss(%) 
 Single(20) -0.008 -0.022 -0.024
*the number in (  ) is the number of auctions fallen into the group 
 
         First of all, the average of MCPv in the single price auction is higher than that of 
the multiple price auction, except the continuous FOC case.54  This finding supports 
                                                 
         54  However, in the results of continuous case, since MCPv in the auction #1 is quite 
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our expectation for the shading incentive around MCP which is much stronger in the 
single price auction than in the multiple price auction. 
         Obviously, the percentage of revenue loss which is compared to the potential 
Vickery auction revenue tells us that the multiple price auction outperforms the single 
price auction in terms of revenue because every mean value in the multiple price 
auction has a positive sign. As we saw in the results for the test of revenue equivalence, 
the difference in Rv and Ra seemed to be significant.   
         Comparing Figure 17 and Figure 21 which depict the aggregate bid and the 
aggregate valuation schedule, we can expect that the total bid shading amount from the 
bidders’ true valuation is likely to be larger in the multiple price auction than in the 
single price auction. That is, the single price auction may induce bidders to submit 
their bids more closely to their true value than the multiple price auction. However, 
even though larger bid shading may occur in the multiple price auction, the multiple 
price auction is more advantageous to the Korean Treasury in terms of the revenue. 
 
6.5 Discussion of the Efficiency Matter 
 
         The efficient auction mechanism is the mechanism which puts items in the hands 
of those who value them the most. In the case of auctions for single, indivisible item, it 
is well known that the second-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction induce 
                                                                                                                                             
big(10007.4KW) compared to others we need to consider the fact that this value may distort the total 
mean value and the mean for the bigger total supply group. 
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buyers to bid sincerely so that efficient outcomes are always possible. Under the first-
price sealed-bid auction, bidders shade their bids relative to their true values, but 
efficiency is still possible when there are symmetric bidders who adopt symmetric 
strategies.     
         However, in the circumstances of the multi-unit auction in which the items for 
sale are divisible and bidders can demand multiple units, there is no general conclusion 
about efficiency ranking between the multiple price auction and the single price 
auction.  
         Earlier researchers who assumed each bidder demands only a single unit among 
the several units suggested a similar prediction to that of the results for the  single-unit 
auction. That is, in the multiple price auction there exists bid shading whereas in the 
single price auction bidders bid their true value which means that there is no bid 
reduction. Therefore, the single price auction may be superior to the multiple price 
auction in efficiency.55 As I pointed out in the earlier part of this paper, this conclusion 
was misleading by an imperfect analogy between single-unit and multi-unit auctions.  
         After researchers began to consider the case where bidders desired multiple units 
explicitly, different predictions about efficiency from the above have been suggested. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn(1998a)56 concluded that both multiple price auctions 
and single price auctions are not efficient because there exists bid shading in both 
auction formats. More specifically, they pointed out that in the multiple price auction 
                                                 
         55 Harris and Raviv(81) 
         56 They analyzed the case where N+1 bidders demand up to two identical units.  
 102
there is the tendency for the higher bids to be shaded more significantly while in the 
single price auction the tendency is reversed which means the shading becomes more 
significantly for the lower valued units. Back and Zender(93) predicted that the 
multiple price auction may be more efficient because relatively high inframarginal bids 
are costless in a single price auction but they are costly in a multiple price auction. 
Therefore, the multiple price auction induces bidders to submit flatter demand curves, 
which in turn stimulates greater price competition at the margin.   
         Most recently, Ausubel and Crampton(2002) analyzed a more general case where 
bidders submit a continuous downward sloping demand and suggested that the 
efficiency of the multiple price auction may exceed that of the single price auction. 
The intuition for that derives from the fact that the multiple price auction is not subject 
to bid shading that is increasing in quantity because a bid for an additional unit in the 
multiple price auction has no effect on the price which is paid for earlier units. So it is 
possible for bidders with similar marginal valuations at different quantities to be 
shading their bids by similar amounts. However, in the single price auction a bidder’s 
bid on a later unit will be pivotal to decide his payment so that he has an incentive to 
bid less than his true value on later units in order to reduce the price he will pay on the 
earlier units. Therefore, bidders with identical marginal valuations may shade their 
bids by different amounts at different quantities.   
         In conclusion, the general opinion about efficiency in the multi unit auction is 
that since both auction formats result in bid shading, no obvious efficiency ranking is 
possible, though some researchers support that the multiple price auction may be 
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superior to the single price auction in efficiency. Hence, we have to view this matter as 
an empirical question that depends on the actual nature of demands.  
         As appropriate indices that can indicate the efficiency change, I suggest two 
candidates. First of all, considering the definition of efficiency and the characteristic of 
multiple bids per one bidder in the TB auction,  how many bids are switched from a 
winning to a losing bid when ordering the actual bids by their estimated true valuations 
may be a possible indication of efficiency. If some bids which win under true valuation 
ordering are switched to lose under actual bid ordering, and the number of switches is 
larger in one auction format, say A,  than in the other format B, it implies that the 
possibility of failing to allocate the items to the bidder who values them more is higher 
in format A.  
         Next candidate for efficiency measure is to compare the winners’ total valuations 
under true valuation ordering[True winners’ total valuations] with actual winners’ total 
valuations which I will name by TWV and AWV respectively. If the gap between 
TWV and AWV is bigger in format A, it means that the amount of potential surplus 
which the winners can obtain is reduced more in A or that format A realizes more loss 
of valuations. This measurement gives us the information about the amount of 
efficiency loss differently from the switched number of bids. 
         Table 12, 13 and 14 summarize these two indicators for each auction.  From 
Table 12, we can see the number of switched bids is greater in the single price auction 
than in the multiple price auction. Also, the quantity change corresponding to the 
switched bids is quite larger in the single price auction.  
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TABLE 12 − Efficiency Implication 1 : Bid Switching 
 
Con. FOC Dis. FOC (w/ correction)  
Dis. FOC 
(w/o correction)  Format Date 
Num. Qt.(%) Num. Qt.(%) Num. Qt.(%) 
9/13/1999 0 0.00 2 1.67 2 1.67
10/11/1999 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
11/15/1999 0 0.00 1 1.69 0 0.00
1/17/2000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
2/14/2000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
3/13/2000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
4/10/2000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
5/8/2000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
6/12/2000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
Multi 
Price 
 
7/10/2000 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
8/14/2000 0 0.00 5 16.60 2 8.33
9/18/2000 0 0.00 1 2.22 3 7.78
10/9/2000 0 0.00 5 8.89 6 8.33
11/13/2000 0 0.00 7 31.58 6 16.84
1/8/2001 0 0.00 2 5.33 4 12.00
2/5/2001 0 0.00 5 11.69 4 11.69
3/12/2001 0 0.00 1 2.00 1 2.00
4/2/2001 0 0.00 4 10.00 2 5.00
5/7/2001 1 5.00 3 13.33 4 21.67
6/4/2001 2 10.00 1 2.50 2 10.00
7/2/2001 1 7.50 1 2.50 1 7.50
8/6/2001 0 0.00 2 8.57 3 7.14
9/3/2001 0 0.00 2 8.24 2 12.94
10/8/2001 0 0.00 6 11.24 5 8.99
11/7/2001 0 0.00 3 5.33 6 10.67
12/3/2001 0 0.00 4 13.51 6 10.81
1/7/2002 3 5.00 2 2.50 4 9.17
2/4/2002 0 0.00 2 7.50 3 25.00
3/4/2002 0 0.00 3 8.00 3 8.00
Single 
Price 
4/1/2002 0 0.00 4 14.04 4 14.04
  * Switched bids which are winning when truth-telling but losing when actual bidding 
         (number of bids and corresponding incremental bid quantities measured by  % of total supply) 
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TABLE 13 − Efficiency Implication 2 : Surplus Change(mill US$) 
 
Con. FOC Dis. FOC (w/ correction)  
Dis. FOC 
(w/o correction)  Format Date 
TWV AWV TWV AWV TWV AWV 
9/13/1999 1457.438 1457.438 1039.670 1039.598 1039.274 1039.242 
10/11/1999 1134.640 1134.640 1132.526 1132.524 1132.521 1132.520 
11/15/1999 994.603 994.603 990.870 990.865 990.857 990.855 
1/17/2000 637.796 637.796 637.686 637.685 637.686 637.685 
2/14/2000 1025.597 1025.597 1026.488 1026.488 1026.488 1026.488 
3/13/2000 555.606 555.606 554.032 554.032 554.031 554.031 
4/10/2000 873.687 873.687 704.762 704.762 704.663 704.663 
5/8/2000 635.150 635.150 640.418 640.418 640.417 640.417 
6/12/2000 608.645 608.645 558.419 558.399 558.167 558.123 
Multi 
Price 
 
7/10/2000 756.150 756.150 496.082 496.038 496.084 496.075 
8/14/2000 500.429 500.429 500.646 500.544 500.509 500.476 
9/18/2000 750.604 750.604 750.593 750.576 750.590 750.547 
10/9/2000 750.440 750.440 750.697 750.441 750.438 750.406 
11/13/2000 791.974 791.974 792.585 792.033 792.014 791.983 
1/8/2001 625.640 625.640 625.998 625.578 625.741 625.648 
2/5/2001 643.105 643.105 643.124 642.983 643.771 642.976 
3/12/2001 417.284 417.284 417.334 417.275 417.313 417.270 
4/2/2001 667.975 667.975 670.036 667.790 667.894 667.777 
5/7/2001 500.565 500.565 500.675 500.610 500.701 500.582 
6/4/2001 333.687 333.687 333.751 333.667 333.671 333.649 
7/2/2001 333.712 333.712 333.786 333.781 333.787 333.696 
8/6/2001 584.109 584.109 584.084 584.003 584.022 583.956 
9/3/2001 709.274 709.274 709.533 709.378 709.361 709.246 
10/8/2001 742.583 742.583 742.538 742.459 742.503 742.411 
11/7/2001 625.725 625.725 625.805 625.693 625.679 625.658 
12/3/2001 925.773 925.773 926.009 925.853 925.851 925.787 
1/7/2002 1001.259 1001.259 1001.182 1001.111 1001.175 1001.032 
2/4/2002 333.571 333.571 333.628 333.584 333.588 333.564 
3/4/2002 417.060 417.060 417.203 417.074 417.069 417.043 
Single 
Price 
4/1/2002 475.859 475.859 475.509 475.351 475.376 475.335 
TWV :  the sum of winners’ valuation under truth-telling = the area under aggregate       
         marginal valuation function 
AWV :  the sum of actual winners’ valuations 
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TABLE 14 − Efficiency Implication 3: TWV-AWV(mill US$)57 
Format Date Con. FOC Dis. FOC (w/ correction)  
Dis. FOC 
(w/o correction) 
9/13/1999 0.007 0.073 0.031
10/11/1999 0.007 0.001 0.001
11/15/1999 0.010 0.004 0.001
1/17/2000 0.004 0.001 0.001
2/14/2000 0.004 0.000 0.000
3/13/2000 0.002 0.000 0.000
4/10/2000 0.007 0.000 0.000
5/8/2000 0.002 0.000 0.000
6/12/2000 0.007  0.019 0.044
7/10/2000 0.001 0.043 0.009
Multi 
Price 
 
(Mean) 0.005  0.014 0.009
8/14/2000 0.001  0.102 0.033
9/18/2000 0.005 0.017 0.043
10/9/2000 0.002 0.256 0.032
11/13/2000 0.001 0.553 0.031
1/8/2001 0.000 0.419 0.094
2/5/2001 0.000 0.140 0.794
3/12/2001 0.000 0.059 0.044
4/2/2001 0.003 2.247 0.116
5/7/2001 0.001 0.065 0.119
6/4/2001 0.026 0.084 0.021
7/2/2001 0.002 0.005 0.091
8/6/2001 0.002 0.080 0.065
9/3/2001 0.001 0.155 0.115
10/8/2001 0.001 0.078 0.092
11/7/2001 0.000 0.112 0.022
12/3/2001 0.001 0.157 0.064
1/7/2002 0.281 0.071 0.143
2/4/2002 0.003 0.043 0.024
3/4/2002 0.001 0.129 0.026
4/1/2002 0.001 0.157 0.042
Single 
Price 
(Mean) 0.017 0.246 0.101
                                                 
         57 In calculating TWV and AWV, for the bids that tied at the market clearing price I rationed the 
demands exceeding total supply by tied bidders’ incremental bid quantities at that price following the 
actual rationing rule. Therefore, in case of the auction without any bid switched, we can see somewhat 
small amount of surplus change due to the change in the composition of tied bids.   
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         From Table 14, the average difference of TWV and AWV are over 10 times 
larger in the single price auction than in the multiple price auction. These results seem 
to support the recent argument about efficiency in the multi-unit auction, which is, the 
multiple price auction may be better than the single price auction in efficiency.     
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CHAPTER VII 
 
THE ROBUSTNESS OF MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
         In this CHAPTER, I reinvestigate two assumptions which I postponed in earlier 
discussions in CHAPTER IV. First, I will discuss a way to deal with certain kinds of 
asymmetries among bidders within our resampling procedure, and compare the 
empirical results when asymmetries are considered and the previous results with a 
symmetric bidder. Then I will investigate the underlying value structure of the Korean 
Treasury auction market by testing whether a common value component is present. I 
will also see if it is stronger compared to a private value. This is to see if my analysis 
under the PIV setting is adequate to explain the real Korean situation. 
 
7.1  Asymmetries among Bidders  
 
         It is well known that if bidders are not symmetric in an auction the outcome 
would be different from if we assume symmetric bidders. In the case of the single unit 
auction, there are many literatures to account for the asymmetries under both the PIV 
setting and the CV setting.58 They are mainly dealing with the comparison of the first 
                                                 
         58 An example of an asymmetric bidding situation in the single unit auction arises in government 
procurement when both domestic and foreign firms submit bids and for some reason, there are 
systematic cost differences between domestic and foreign firms. Another example can be found in 
antiques auctions in which bidders can be classified into dealers and collectors.  
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price auction and the English auction, and conclude that asymmetry breaks down the 
Revenue Equivalence between the benchmark auction models.59  
         However, in multi unit auction cases, though some policy experimental 
researches attempted to explain the asymmetries by introducing the bidder’s type 
dummy in a reduced form of the regression model, it is very hard to find the literatures 
which consider asymmetry in both theoretical papers and empirical papers using the 
structural model approach. 
         In this section, I try to recognize whether my data reveal any type of asymmetries 
among the bidders, and I try to modify my current resampling method to cope with the 
existence of asymmetries. I will also perform the empirical estimation for the revenue 
and efficiency comparison with relaxing the symmetry assumption.  
         Since it is not possible to extend the resampling strategy in a way to control for 
bidder-level fixed effects, I will restrict my concern to the case where the sample can 
be broken down to a small number of i.i.d sub-samples. 
         When we consider grouping the data, one practical concern still remains. That is 
“what is the proper number of groups?”. If it is too large, then the number of elements 
in each group gets smaller so that it makes the problem similar to a bidder-level fixed 
effects. If it is small but the number of elements in each group is too uneven(eg. 
                                                 
         59  Maskin & Riley(85) conjecture that, with asymmetric bidders, a first price auction yields a 
higher expected revenue than an English auction if the bidders have similar valuation distributions but 
with different supports. McAfee & McMillan(87) argue that when bidders are asymmetric, the first price 
sealed bid auction yields a different price from the English auction, and the Revenue Equivalence breaks 
down. 
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group1=2 and group2=26), the randomness of the resamples from smaller groups will 
disappear. Therefore, the proper number of groups should be small and the number of 
elements of each group should be allocated as evenly as possible. In this case, dividing 
into 2 or 3 groups seems to be best considering that the range of total number of 
bidders is 23 to 31.  
  
7.1.1 The Existence of Asymmetries in My Data 
 
         Keeping in mind the consideration about the proper number of groups, I expect 
two possible kinds of asymmetries. First of all there may be asymmetry between banks 
and security houses. In Korea, these two groups are thought to be different from each 
other in terms of funding capability and the activity in the TB market. Banks are 
generally superior to the security houses in their funding capability and banks are 
believed to participate in the auction to hold TBs, while security houses want to trade 
them in the secondary market. This makes the grouping quite obvious. Hence the 
asymmetry between these two is worth being tested. 
         The other possibility is the asymmetry between big bidders and small bidders. 
The sources of this asymmetry may come from the difference in their ability to acquire 
information. We can think of the big bidders as having advanced business networks 
compared to the small bidders. This lets the big bidders acquire more accurate 
information which is required to make better expectations of the auction outcome.60 
                                                 
         60 Umlauf(93), in his study of Mexican T-bill auction, found evidence that large bidders’ ex post 
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However, the groupings according to size do not have an absolute criterion so that we 
must be very careful when selecting the cutting line between the groups. There are 
many possibilities for choosing a criterion to classify the size of the bidders. For 
example, amount of assets, the amount of capital, and the amount of revenue, etc. 
However, these criteria may not always indicate how actively the bidders play in the 
Treasury market. Therefore, I used the performances within the auction market itself to 
classify the size of the bidders by the total bid amounts and the total winning amounts 
by each bidder. 
         In order to divide the bidders by size, I choose the following way: 
1) Ranked firms by their total bid quantities in a multiple price auction period and in a 
single price auction period, respectively. 
2) Found the point of the biggest gap between one and the next. 
3) Used a ranking by total winning quantities as a supplementary criterion. That is, I 
ranked firms by total winning quantities again. If the firm belonging to the big group 
in terms of total bid amounts is still found in the big group in terms of winning 
quantities,  it was classified as a big bidder, but if not, it was removed from the big 
bidder group. 
         Before grouping according to the method above, we still need to consider that 
bidders were not identical for all of the auctions during the sample period. Some firms 
remained on PDs’ list at all times, but others entered or exited. Therefore, to maintain 
                                                                                                                                             
profits exceeded those of small bidders, and explained this by saying that small bidders bid solely on the 
basis of public information. Hendricks & Porter and Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom & Weber(83) dealt 
with this kind of information asymmetries  in the single unit auction environment.  
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the consistency for the pool of bidders, I get rid of 2 banks and 6 security houses which 
showed long discontinuity in participation from the data for a multiple price auction 
period, and 5 banks and 5 security houses for a single price auction period. Thus 
finally we have totally 30 bidders(16 banks, 14 security houses) for a multiple price 
auction and 28 bidders(13 banks, 15 security houses) for a single price auction.  
         For a multiple price auction period, I found a big decrease between the 12th and 
13th bidder which amounted to 93 billion KW, and first I choose 12 firms as big 
bidders. However, after applying the criterion of the winning amount, I removed five 
firms from the original 12 firms so that finally I have 7 firms as big bidders. In the 
case of the single price auction period, I found a big gap between the 13th and 14th 
bidder which amounted to 250 billion KW and chose the top 13 firms as big bidders. 
Among them one firm was dropped by the winning amount criterion so that 12 firms 
were chosen as big bidders for a single price auction period.61 
         Now, I attempted to figure out which classification is more reasonable to capture 
asymmetries by looking at some summary statistics. Table 15 and Table 16 show the 
mean values of several characteristics between the classified groups. Form Table 15, it 
is difficult to find significant differences between the banks and the security firms 
except for few items such as average bid quantities, the number of bids in a single 
price auction period and a bid spread measured by the difference between maximum 
                                                 
         61 Big bidders’ code: multiple price auction : #3, #6, #9, #23, #27, #29, #30 / single price auction : 
#3, #6, #8, #19, #21, #22, #23, #24, #27, #28, #29, #30  
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bid and MCP in a single price auction period.62 In contrast, we do see that more of a 
distinction between the big and small firms under both of the auction formats in Table 
16.  
 
TABLE 15 − Comparison b/w Banks and Security Firms 
 Multiple price auction Single price auction 
 Bank Security Bank Security 
Participation ratio(%) 90.62 95.71 78.57 87.66
Avg. Bid quant. 
(% of total supply) 8.17 10.17 8.62 11.86
Avg. Win quant. 
(% of total supply) 3.46 3.64 3.81 4.30
# of  bids 3.35 3.84 2.53 3.33
# of winning bids 1.78 1.94 1.30 1.52
Max bid–Min bid(KW) 11.27 11.34 12.07 17.53
Max bid–MCP(KW) 2.59 4.13 5.76 7.33
 
TABLE 16 − Comparison b/w Big and Small Bidders 
 Multiple price auction Single price auction 
 Big Small Big Small 
Participation ratio(%) 95.71 92.17 95.41 74.70
Avg. Bid quant. 
(% of total supply) 13.80 7.67 13.36 8.14
Avg. Win quant. 
(% of total supply) 5.62 2.92 5.19 3.27
# of  bids 4.01 3.45 3.54 2.51
# of winning bids 2.24 1.74 1.70 1.21
Max bid–Min bid(KW) 11.27 11.31 19.31 11.78
Max bid–MCP(KW) 4.28 3.02 8.73 5.05
 
                                                 
         62 Both the average of bid quantities and winning quantities of security firms are larger than those 
of banks. This may reflect the fact that the number of banks among the big bidders is relatively small for 
both auction periods, which are 3/7 for multiple price auction period and 3/12 for single price auction 
period.  
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         Therefore, the classification of big and small firms is more likely to capture the 
distinction between groups than that of the banks and security firms. Also, in Table 16, 
we can see that big firms seem to use a greater number of bids and more widely spread 
bids, especially in the range of above MCP versus the small firms. This may reflect 
that big firms are likely to be stronger in collecting potential demand using their 
business networks, and that they are likely to participate in the auction more 
aggressively due to certain factors such as to maintain their market share.  
         In conclusion, I decided to choose the classification of big and small firms in the 
analysis of asymmetries.  
 
7.1.2 Effects of Introducing Asymmetries in the Previous Model  
 
         To summarize, the model analyzed in the previous CHAPTER assumes that each 
bidder has his own private signal ti regarding his value from winning a given quantity 
of the TB which is assumed to be drawn from the commonly known distribution of 
signals across the bidders, F(t), with the marginal distribution of bidder i, Fi(t). In 
addition, bidder i’s marginal value from winning q unite of TB is given by the 
marginal valuation function, vi(q, ti). Symmetric assumption was imposed by dropping 
the subscript i in either Fi(t) or vi(q, ti). That is, we assumed that there is one common 
distribution F from which the bidders draw their signals, or that the form of the 
marginal valuation function is identical across the bidders.       
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         However, in the previous CHAPTER, instead of estimating the signal distribution 
or identifying the explicit functional form of the optimal bid function or the valuation 
function, we estimated the distribution of market clearing price by the construction of a 
residual supply using the observed bid vectors. In doing that, we implicitly assumed 
that others’ optimal bid strategies, q*j(p, tj), are the results of their own signals drawn 
from a common distribution among all bidders, F(.), even though we do not know the 
exact mapping between the signal and optimal bid function. Further we assumed that 
their observed bid vectors are their optimal bid functions.  
         Now, suppose that the asymmetry is introduced between group1(N1) and 
group2(N2). If we assume that signals. where the members of each group draw their 
signals independently from the distribution F1(.) and F2(.) respectively, and two 
distributions are independent of each other, then we can interpret the residual supply as 
sum of total N-1 random variables which are composed of N1-1 random variables 
drawn from F1(.) and N2 drawn from F2(.) independently.    
         Considering the setting and solving of a bidder’s profit maximization problem in 
the previous CHAPTER, though the construction of a residual supply becomes [sum of 
(N1-1) bid vectors + sum of N2 bid vectors] if bidder i belongs to group1, this doesn’t 
change the definition of H(.) and the form of FOC which we derived under symmetric 
assumption  
         The validity of the resampling method is also maintained with the asymmetries 
because the observed q(p) is assumed to be the outcome of optimal strategic behavior 
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even though the underlying mapping now becomes (ti, F1(t), F2(t))Æq(p,ti) instead of 
(ti, F(t))Æq(p,ti). 
         To see this more clearly in our model, I provide a simple example with a few 
assumptions about the distributions. 
         Suppose that there are n1 type 1 bidders and n2 type 2 bidders and type i bidders  
draw their signals from Fi which is a normal distribution with mean it  and variance 
2
iσ . Also suppose that their optimal bid function is linear in price and the signals, that 
is: 
                  iiiii ctpbatpy ++=),(   
         If the bidder belongs to type 1, his market clearing condition is: 
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         Hence, in order to maximize their expected profit, type 1 and type 2 have to solve 
the same form of FOC as the previous one but they must consider the different 
composition of the distributions for the market clearing price according to their types. 
 
7.1.3 Modification of the Resampling Procedure  
 
         In order to apply the resampling method to the asymmetric bidder case, we need 
to modify the resampling procedure slightly according to which group a bidder belongs 
to using the following: 
 
1. Fix bidder i 
2. If i belongs to N1 group, draw N1-1 bid vectors from N1 bid vectors by giving  the 
same probability 1/N1, and draw N2 bid vectors from N2 bid vectors by giving the 
same probability 1/N2 
3. With these resampled bid vectors(N1-1+N2), construct the residual supply faced 
by bidder i and intersect i’s actual bid schedule to find market clearing price. 
4. Repeat the above procedure B times, and find B market clearing prices. 
5. Estimate H(.) and related derivatives for bidder i who belongs to N1  
   6. Do the same procedure for bidder who is in N2 group 
 
         The remaining steps to compare the revenue or the efficiency after resampling 
the are same as before. 
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7.1.4 Empirical Result with Asymmetries Assumption 
 
         To highlight the difference from the symmetric case, I present only the results of 
the discrete version of FOCs with correction terms.63  Table 17 summarizes the change 
in revenue terms and Table 18 displays the change in the efficiency implication.  
         Note that the figures of symmetric case are slightly different from those using the 
same FOCs shown in the previous CHAPTER. This is because, in this CHAPTER, I 
excluded some bidders who showed long discontinuity in participating in the auction 
for each auction period. Especially, in auction #27(1/7/2002) and auction 
#30(4/1/2002) many bid points were removed from the original data set which were 20 
and 13 bid points respectively, so we need to be careful with these two auctions.  
         If I assume the existence of asymmetries between big and small firms, the results 
are not much different from where I simply assumed symmetry. The mean values of 
MCPv and the revenue loss rate do not change much for both auction formats. The 
efficiency results under asymmetries also have the same interpretation as those under 
symmetries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
         63 In the case of the other two versions of FOCs, I got qualitatively similar results.  
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TABLE 17 − Changes by Asymmetries in Revenue Comparison 
MCPv Revenue loss(%) (=[Ra-Rv]/Rv)  Date 
Asym. Sym. Asym. Sym. 
9/13/1999 10000.88 10002.59 0.117 0.100
10/11/1999 10000.00 10000.00 0.033 0.033
11/15/1999 10000.18 10000.27 0.024 0.023
1/17/2000 10000.00 10000.00 0.039 0.039
2/14/2000 10000.00 10000.00 0.029 0.029
3/13/2000 10000.00 10000.00 0.027 0.027
4/10/2000 10000.00 10000.00 0.018 0.018
5/8/2000 10000.00 10000.00 0.018 0.017
6/12/2000 10000.21 10000.00 0.080 0.082
7/10/2000 10002.65 10000.02 0.025 0.051
M 
U 
L 
T 
I 
 
(Mean) 10000.39 10000.28 0.041 0.042
8/14/2000 10002.84 10002.70 -0.028 -0.027
9/18/2000 10000.00 10000.00 0.000 0.000
10/9/2000 10002.65 10002.81 -0.027 -0.028
11/13/2000 10001.31 10002.17 -0.013 -0.022
1/8/2001 10000.00 10001.29 0.000 -0.013
2/5/2001 10002.75 10002.75 -0.028 -0.028
3/12/2001 10002.72 10002.72 -0.027 -0.027
4/2/2001 10000.00 10002.77 0.000 -0.028
5/7/2001 10004.34 10002.72 -0.043 -0.027
6/4/2001 10003.02 10002.70 -0.030 -0.027
7/2/2001 10002.73 10002.51 -0.027 -0.025
8/6/2001 10002.14 10002.30 -0.021 -0.023
9/3/2001 10001.84 10000.79 -0.018 -0.008
10/8/2001 10002.80 10002.16 -0.028 -0.022
11/7/2001 10000.01 9999.99 0.000 0.000
12/3/2001 10001.50 10001.62 0.021 -0.016
1/7/2002* 9997.69 10000.00 -0.004 -0.027
2/4/2002 10001.34 10001.29 -0.013 -0.013
3/4/2002* 10001.83 10001.93 -0.046 -0.047
4/1/2002* 9998.90 9998.99 -0.016 -0.017
S 
I 
N 
G 
L 
E 
 
(Mean) 10001.52 10001.71 -0.017 -0.021
     The actual MCP in the auctions with * are 9997.2 KW due to the exclusion of some bidders who     
      didn’t participate the auction continuously.  
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TABLE 18 − Changes by Asymmetries in Efiiciency 
# of  
Bid Switch 
Quant. Change of  
Bid Switch(%) 
TWV-AWV 
(mill US$)  Date 
Asym Sym. Asym. Sym. Asym. Sym. 
9/13/1999 2 2 1.67 1.67 0.068 0.073
10/11/1999 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.001
11/15/1999 0 1 0.00 1.69 0.002 0.004
1/17/2000 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.001
2/14/2000 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
3/13/2000 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
4/10/2000 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
5/8/2000 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
6/12/2000 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.016 0.044
7/10/2000 1 0 1.71 0.00 0.127 0.043
M 
U 
L 
T 
I 
 
(Mean) 0.34 0.34 0.021 0.017
8/14/2000 6 5 16.67 15.00 0.189 0.033
9/18/2000 1 1 2.22 2.22 0.014 0.014
10/9/2000 6 6 12.22 12.22 0.137 0.140
11/13/2000 6 7 22.11 31.58 0.923 0.553
1/8/2001 1 1 1.30 1.30 0.089 0.077
2/5/2001 5 5 11.69 11.69 0.119 0.140
3/12/2001 1 1 2.00 2.00 0.194 0.059
4/2/2001 1 5 1.25 13.75 0.043 0.129
5/7/2001 3 3 13.33 13.33 0.229 0.065
6/4/2001 1 1 2.50 2.50 0.099 0.084
7/2/2001 1 1 2.50 2.50 0.006 0.005
8/6/2001 2 2 4.29 8.57 0.059 0.080
9/3/2001 3 2 9.41 8.24 0.445 0.155
10/8/2001 6 6 12.36 11.24 0.489 0.078
11/7/2001 4 3 6.67 5.33 0.022 0.112
12/3/2001 4 4 5.40 13.51 0.068 0.157
1/7/2002* 5 6 8.33 15.00 0.163 0.280
2/4/2002 2 2 7.50 7.50 0.078 0.042
3/4/2002* 3 3 8.00 8.00 0.080 0.077
4/1/2002* 4 4 12.28 12.28 0.275 0.227
S 
I 
N 
G 
L 
E 
 
(Mean) 8.10 9.89 0.186 0.125
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7.2  The Presence of Common Values  
 
         As I pointed out in CHAPTER IV, the underlying value structure may be a  very 
critical assumption in designing the optimal auction mechanism because the structure 
of the expected pay-off functions and the equilibrium strategies may vary depending 
upon the assumption of the value paradigm. In addition, the PIV and CV should be 
interpreted as extreme cases. Real world auction situations are likely to contain both 
aspects, simultaneously.  
         Focusing on a TB auction, Bikhchandani and Huang (1993)64 and Commack 
(1991)65 argued that whenever bidders buy an object for resale rather than for personal 
consumption, the common value assumption is reasonable and that in a Treasury 
auction, the CV is more appropriate because the value of each bidder is the resale price 
which is common but unknown to all the bidder.66 However, they didn’t exclude the 
possibility of a more general value structure either. As Bikhchandani & Huang pointed 
out, in the Treasury securities markets, the primary dealers’ private information comes 
from two sources. First, primary dealers have their own forecasts of the movements of 
the term structure of interest rates. Second, which is more important thing, before the 
                                                 
         64 See Bikhchandani and Huang (1993). 
         65  Cammack(1991),  “The appropriate model for the treasury auction is the CV, where the true  of 
the good being auctioned is the same for all bidders but the true value is unknown and bidders have 
different information about it.” 
         66  Actually, a similar idea to this can be found in Smith(66). He divided his models into three types 
according to whether or not the bidders consider the resale price though he didn’t mention the term of 
the valuation. 
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auction institutional buyers such as pension funds and insurance companies place 
orders for Treasury securities to be auctioned with primary dealers. This conveys 
information about the demand for these securities. Therefore, the two incentives may 
exist to purchase the securities at the same time so that the valuation may also be ruled 
by both the PIV and the CV structure. 
         However, in the cases of an auction for multi-unit item, as I mentioned, the 
complete development in terms of both the theoretical model and the empirical 
methodology for this matter has not been accomplished. To my knowledge, there is no 
literature dealing with the multi-unit case regarding the test to see if a CV component 
exists. Also, the nonparametric “structural model estimation” such as that 
demonstrated in this paper cannot be applied to the case where a CV component is 
present because this method critically hinges on the assumption that bid functions are 
i.i.d. If there is a CV component, the bidders’ valuations should be correlated.  
         Considering the above limitation in availability of complete examples for the 
value structure in the multi-unit auction case, in this section, I will just attempt to test 
the presence of a CV component using basically the idea which has been developed in 
single unit auction literatures instead of estimating the structural model under the 
presence of a CV component. I think that this attempt itself is meaningful because it 
may give us some useful information to the question, “Was the PIV assumption in the 
Korean auction market very bad?” and it is the first attempt to test the presence of CV 
in the multi-unit auction environment.  
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7.2.1 Theoretical Prediction of Bid Behavior to Value Structure 
 
         Under the existence of common values, bidders are susceptible to the winner’s 
curse. It occurs in this way: assume for simplicity that one indivisible object is for sale 
and that bidders use similar rules-of-thumb to calculate their bids based on their 
estimates of the true underlying value. In a common value auction with many bidders, 
even though each bidder’s estimate is unbiased, some estimates will be high and some 
low. As a result, the highest bidder (the winner) is usually the one who is the most 
optimistic about the true value. Or to put it another way, upon winning, the successful 
bidder then learns something striking: all the other bidders had lower estimates of the 
true value. A bidder who fails to take this factor into account may easily bid too high, 
thus winning the auction but discovering he bid too high given the realized value of the 
good. This phenomenon is called the winner’s curse. 67 
                                                 
         67  There is the concept of the “Loser’s Curse” which was introduced in Pesendorfer and 
Swinkels(1997). In the literatures of common value auction, it has been one of the biggest concerns of 
the researchers whether the auction mechanism can aggregate the information that is diffused through 
the economy, which becomes whether the bid price converges in probability to true common value. 
Their object is also to show the condition for the price convergence to the true value. They worked with 
the auction allocating k identical objects to n bidders instead of selling just single item. However, since 
they restricted each bidder to obtain only one object, the structure of auction is same as the single item 
auction. With this setting, they proved the convergence with interaction of winner’s curse effect and 
loser’s curse effect. Winning with a bid b conveys the negative information that at most k of the other 
bidders submitted bid above b upon receiving their signals. This is the winner’s curse. However losing 
with a bid b conveys the positive information that at most n-k of the other bidders chose to bid below b. 
They called this “Loser’s Curse”. Therefore they established that if both k and n-k go to infinity, then 
two effects balance to yield the equilibrium price which converges to the true value. However, because 
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         The winner’s curse has several implications for optimal bidding strategies.68 
First, as the number of bidders increase (and other factors are held constant), it is 
usually optimal to bid more conservatively. This is because the highest of, say ten 
estimates is likely to be much greater than the highest of two estimates.  Thus the 
winner’s curse is reinforced as the number of bidders increases and, despite the 
increased competitive pressure, it often causes bidders to shade their bids below their 
estimates of true underlying value by a greater amount. Nevertheless, the effect of 
having more bidders tends to outweigh the incentives for bidding conservatively, in 
that the highest bids and the selling price increase as the number of bidders increases. 
On the other hand, the reverse change of the bidding behavior may be possible. That is, 
initially more competition due to the increase in number of bidders makes the bidder 
more aggressive, but with more competition, bidders must also recognize the winner’s 
curse effect and hence bid functions ultimately decrease in competition. Therefore, in 
general, the expected value of the winning bid at auctions within the common value 
paradigm will have no predictable relationship with the number of bidders.69 However 
under the private value paradigm, since there is no winner’s curse effect and bidders 
consider only competition effect, the winning bid will increase monotonically with the 
number of bidders. 
                                                                                                                                             
the main purpose of this section is testing the existence of CV and it is not  available to predict the effect 
of the “Loser’s Curse” on our auction environment, I will ignore this effect in my analysis to simplify 
the problem.           
         68 Bikhchandani & Huang(1993) 
         69 See Paarsch(1990) p.198. 
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         Second, as the uncertainty about the value of the object decreases, the winner’s 
curse is weaker. For example, if a bidder can assess the true value to within, say, plus 
or minus 10 percent, then the highest estimate will tend to be much lower than if 
bidders can assess the true value only to within plus or minus 50 percent. As 
uncertainty decreases, bidders recognize that they have less to worry about from the 
winner’s curse. They bid less conservatively, and the selling price typically increases. 
Naturally, in private value paradigm, the bidders don’t have to infer the true value of 
the object so that the bid is not affected by the degree of the uncertainty.  
         To summarize graphically, the predicted relationships between bid prices and the 
number of bidders or the uncertainty in the value of the item to be auctioned can be 
depicted in Figure 23. 
 
7.2.2 Empirical Framework to Test the Value Structure  
 
         Although deciding which paradigm applies in a specific situation is of 
considerable interest to those using auctions, there were few papers which developed 
an empirical framework within which to examine this matter. For the auction of a 
single good, Paarsch(1992) designed and applied the empirical framework to data from 
a sample of tree planting contract auctions held in the province of British Colombia, 
Canada in an attempt to decide between PIV and CV, but for the multiple unit auction 
this kind of analysis does not exist to my knowledge.  
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                              <CV>                                                         <PIV> 
 
FIGURE 23. Comparison of Bid Behaviors between CV and PIV 
 
         Therefore, instead of developing a rigorous model to test, I will follow the idea 
which was developed in the “Policy Experimental Approach”. That is, I constructed a 
simple regression model which is able to check the relationship between the bid price 
as a dependent variable and the independent variables such as the number of bidders 
and the uncertainty variable to see how strongly these relevant coefficients support the 
theoretical predictions of either a pure CV model or a pure PIV model which were 
discussed in the section 7.2.1.  
 
# of bidders 
uncertainty 
# of bidders 
uncertainty 
p p
p p
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Hypotheses to test 
 
         First of all, I will investigate the behavior of the representative bid price of each 
bidder at each auction according to the change in two key independent variables to see 
general relationship between them. 
         Since a TB auction is for multi-unit items and each bidder can submit multiple 
bids, I will attempt to decompose each bidder’s bid points by scrutinizing the sources 
of demand for the Treasury securities. Then, I will test a more clarified hypothesis 
resulting from this discussion of demand. The sources of demand for the Treasury 
securities can be classified into three categories. They are the reserve requirement, the 
orders from customers, and the arbitrage requirement. 
         Reserve requirement: This is the demand for holding the securities up to its 
maturity. All financial institutions have their own investment schedule which 
distributes their available funds into risk-free assets and risky assets. In order to 
maintain the soundness of their portfolios they must have a certain inner standard 
about the portion of risk-free assets among total assets in their possession. Furthermore 
after the Asian crisis in 1997, the Korean government enforced the regulations on the 
soundness of financial institutions and imposed the obligation of maintaining a certain 
ratio of risk-free assets on them following the international standard. 
         Orders from customers: In the Korean treasury auction market, the banks and 
security houses that are designated as primary dealers can participate in the auction as 
bidders so that other types of institutional buyers like pension funds and insurance 
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companies should buy the bonds to be auctioned via the primary dealers. Since these 
institutions are usually considered to be long-term investors these demands are likely 
for the purpose of holding. The primary dealers who want to buy the bonds on behalf 
of their customers may have a responsibility to fulfill their orders to sustain business 
relationships with them. 
         Arbitrage requirement: This is the demand to get marginal gain through trading 
the bonds which they acquire at the auction. This demand may be less urgent than the 
first two sources and the expectation of the secondary market rate would be important 
when the bidders decide their bidding strategy. 
         Relating these sources to the matter of the value structure, the natural conjecture 
is that the first two sources of demand are likely to be governed by the PIV and the last 
one, arbitrage requirement, be governed by the CV paradigm. In case of the reserve 
requirement, since the degree of urgency to fulfill the requirement may be different 
across the bidders due to the difference in the size of available funds and the status of 
their portfolios, it is reasonable to think that the value of this portion would be placed 
individually and independently. The values of the orders from the customers are 
actually decided by the customers, not by the bidders though they discuss the possible 
bid prices with each other before the auction. If we accept the fact that the customers 
are long-term investors and that they want to buy the bonds for the purpose of holding 
rather than trading, the value can be thought to be governed by PIV. Naturally, it is 
plausible that the value for the arbitrage requirement are more likely to be formed by 
 129
CV because the bidders have to expect the movement of the market rate in the future 
which is common but unknown to all bidders. 
         In order to make these conjectures according to the classification of demand 
sources be testable in my regression model, we need to relate these three kinds of 
demands to their bid prices. For this reason, I divided the three sources into two 
portions again, saying, “MUST BUY” and “MAY BUY”. Since the first two sources of 
demands need to be fulfilled more urgently than the third one, I call the first two 
demands as “MUST BUY” portion and the last one as “MAY BUY” portion.  
         In the case of “MUST BUY” portion, the bidder has to increase the probability of 
winning so we will place the higher bid price to this portion, while the other portion 
has less incentive to place a higher bid. Since the Korean government restricts the 
number of bids to five points we can think of that the relatively higher bid prices may 
be for the “MUST BUY” portion and the relatively lower bid price may be for the 
“MAY BUY” portion.      
         Therefore, the hypothesis related to the demand characteristics is that the MUST 
BUY portion which is represented by relatively higher(or winning) bids is likely to 
follow the PIV paradigm, while the MAY BUY portion which is represented by 
relatively lower(or losing) bids is likely to follow the CV paradigm. 
 
Model and Variables  
 
 130
         To see the effect of the number of bidders and the uncertainty on bid price, I 
suggest the following simple regression model: 
 
BIDPRICEit = C  +  B1*TNUMBIDt  + B2*SQTNUMBIDt  + B3*UNCERTAINt   
                        +  α1*INTERESTt  + α2*TSUPPLYt 
                        +  δ1 *AUCDUMMYt + δ2*BANKDUMMYi  + δ3*BIGDUMMYi   
                        + ERRORit 
  
BIDPRICEit :  
         In this section I will use the same data set as before which covers the results for 
the 3-year TB auctions during Sep. 1999~ Apr. 2002. However, in order to run the 
regression model for this analysis we need to pool the data which was held at different 
times in a certain way. Unlikely to the estimation for each individual auction, when 
pooling the data, it is very important to consider how to normalize the bid price to 
obtain consistency over the whole sample period to be analyzed. Note that in the 
Korean TB auction, the bidders submit yield bids and these yields are fluctuated 
according to the current yield in the resale market at the time of the auction.  In Figure 
24, we can see that the yields of TB in the resale market had a variation from 4% to 
10% during the sample period.  
         Furthermore, considering that the multiple bids are submitted by one bidder, to 
see each bidder’s reaction to the number of bidders or uncertainty we need to have a 
certain type of a representative bid price for each bidder at a certain auction. To test 
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my hypothesis that the “MUST BUY”, where the bidders assign the higher bid price is 
governed by PIV and “MAY BUY”, where bidders assign the lower bid is governed by 
CV, I also have to construct the bid price representing these two portions. 
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FIGURE 24. Trends of Resale Market Rate 
 
         First of all, to obtain the consistency for the bid price over the sample period, I 
calculated the average yield weighted by the probability of each bid yield in the 
distribution of all yields submitted at that auction.70 Then I subtracted each bid yield 
from this weighted average yield so that the resulting value indicates how much higher 
or lower each bid is compared to the average bid price or representative bid price for 
that auction. For example, suppose that 10 bid yields are submitted by bidders at a 
                                                 
         70 I also thought about the average yield weighted by incremental bid quantity. However, there 
were some cases where the relatively big quantity placed at lower bid price so that the quantity weighted 
average may be biased to lower. Thus I decided to use the probability weighted average.    
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certain auction, say, one 7.01%, one 7.02%, two 7.03%, three 7.04%, two 7.05%, and 
one 7.06%. Then the probability distribution assigned to each bid yield is {1/10, 1/10, 
2/10, 3/10, 2/10, and 1/20} and the average yield weighted by these probabilities is 
7.037%. The final bid prices in my data set will be 0.027, 0.017, 0.007, -0.003, -0.013, 
and -0.023. Note that a relatively big positive number implies that a bidder submitted a 
relatively higher bid price to average bid price and that a relatively small positive or a 
big negative number implies that a bidder submitted a lower bid price relative to 
average bid price. Finally, to express this value in terms of basis point71 I multiplied 
these converted bid prices by 100.    
         After the normalization of the bid price, I constructed several dependent variables 
to test my hypotheses. Firstly, to see the general results I constructed WGTBIDit as the 
representative bid price of bidder i at auction t, measured by the probability weighted 
average of bidder i’s bids at auction t. Secondly, to see the bid behavior for the “MUST 
BUY” portion, I used two variables which are the maximum bid (MAXBID) of each 
bidder and the probability weighted average of winning bids (WINBID). Finally, to see 
the bid behavior for the “MAY BUY” portion, I used the probability weighted average 
of losing bids of each bidder (LOSEBID) and the minimum bid (MINBID) as a 
dependent variable.72 
 
 TNUMBIDt: the number of bidders at auction t.  
                                                 
         71 1 basis point corresponds to 0.01%p. 
         72  In case that every bids submitted by one bidder are losing bids, I treat she doesn’t have 
MAXBID. Similarly, if every bids are winning bids, then she doesn’t have MINBID.  
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         The first natural candidate for this variable is the number of bidders to participate 
in the auction t. However, as I pointed out, there are only 38 financial institutions 
which are designated as primary dealers and are allowed to participate in the auction. 
Furthermore, by the contract between the Treasury and the individual institutions, in 
order to maintain the position of primary dealer they are required to participate in the 
auction continuously and to purchase a certain minimum amount of the TB in the 
auction market throughout the whole year. Therefore, the number of bidders may not 
represent the number of real participants. One more thing to be considered is the fact 
that a real demander can be different from the primary dealers because many investors 
who want to purchase bonds but are not PDs such as pension funds and insurance 
companies exist. Therefore I will use the total number of bid points as the proxy of this 
variable instead of the number of bidders.73 
         Table 19 shows the summary statistics and Figure 25 depicts the trends for these 
two variables. We can see that the number of bidders doesn’t have enough variation to 
use as a variable but is highly correlated with the total number of bids. 
 
TABLE 19 − Statistics of #Bids and #Bidders 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
# of bidders 25.9 2.309 23 31 30 
# of bids 83.3 21.817 40 124 30 
Correlation coefficient : 0.83 
 
                                                 
         73 Actually, the number of bids may also have a limit because the total number of bids submitted by 
each bidder is restricted up to five.   
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FIGURE 25. Trends of # Bids and # Bidders 
 
SQTNUMBIDt: The square of total number of bids  
         This is included to capture the parabolic shape of the relationship between 
BIDPRICE and TNUMBID. 
UNCERTAINt: The proxy for the uncertainty about the value of the object 
         A prediction of auction theory is that bidders adjust for the winner’s curse by 
bidding at higher markups in terms of yield over his true valuation in the presence of 
increased uncertainty about the market value of the bonds they purchase. Adopting 
Simon(1992)’s idea, I will use the standard deviation of the market yields, calculated 
from the observations at the close of business for 10 days before the auctions as proxy 
for this variable. 
INTERESTt : The proxy for the (short term) trend of resale market rate  
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         Spreads between the true valuation and actual bid should include a premium for 
the risks involved in bidding at auctions. These risks involved in TB auction may be 
classified into three types of risks. 
         The first one is the winner’s curse if there exists a CV component. Secondly, 
there is the quantity risk which means the risk of not being awarded securities. This is 
important especially for dealers bidding to cover short positions in the auctioned 
security. Finally, the interest rate risk may be involved. That is, if the interest rate in 
the resale market goes up which means the price of the TB goes down, the bidders who 
purchased TB at the auction have to burden the capital loss. This is the most common 
consideration which the bidders are taking into account when they are preparing for 
their bids. Thus, the movement of interest rates in the resale market has nontrivial 
effect on the decisions of bid price.  
         In order to control the effect of relatively short term interest rates on bid price, I 
linearly fitted the trend of resale market rates for 30 days before the auction and used 
the coefficient of that as the proxy for the short term interest rate trend. Note that since 
the interest rate has a reciprocal relationship with TB price, the positive value of the 
coefficient implies a decrease in TB price. 
TSUPPLYt : The total supply of each auction 
         The total supply varies during the sample period as we see in Figure 26. Though 
the amount to be auctioned is announced before the auction, the size of the total supply 
may affect bidders’ bidding strategies. For example, when a pretty big amount is 
auctioned the bidders expect a supply shock in the secondary market in the near future 
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which has an effect of lowering the price. The bidders take this expectation into 
account when deciding their bid prices.  
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FIGURE 26. Total Supply of TB (bill US$) 
 
AUCDUMMYt : The dummy for the change of auction format 
         This is to control the fixed effect due to the switch of the auction format from the 
multiple price auction to the single price auction in Aug. 2000. This dummy takes on 
values of one for multiple price auctions and zero for single price auctions. The 
coefficient of the dummy indicates the average change in BIDPRICE attributable to 
multiple price auction scheme. 
BANKDUMMYi : The dummy variable for banks and security houses 
         This dummy variable takes on values of one for bidders of banks and zero for 
bidders of security houses.  
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BIGDUMMYi : The dummy variable for big and small bidders 
         As I discussed in the section 7.1, there are a few distinctions in bid behavior 
between big and small bidders. However, in the previous section, the big bidders in the 
multiple price auction period are not the same as those in the single price auction 
period. Hence, here, I designated the bidders who were classified as the big bidder for 
both auction periods. There are 6 bidders whose bidder codes are #3, #6, #23, #27, 
#29, and #30. 
        The summary statistics of the variables in the model are in Table 20. 
 
TABLE 20 − Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
WGTBID .197 3.397 -31.481 18.506 777
MAXBID 4.461 5.454 -3.008 98.166 645
WINBID 2.761 3.152 -2.835 25.518 645
LOSEBID -2.715 3.220 -34.997 3.298 593
MINBID -4.105 5.866 -101.951 3.644 593
TNUMBID 84.837 21.756 40 124 777
SQTNUMBID 7670.212 3786.512 1600 15376 777
UNCERTAIN .0983 .0619 .0335 .2936 777
INTEREST -.0059 .0289 -.0857 .0640 777
TSUPPLY .6690 .2209 .3333 1.1311 777
 
Regression results  
 
         Before seeing the empirical results, I will summarize the sign and significance of 
the relevant coefficients for testing my hypotheses predicted by theory. 
         If the Treasury auction is governed by the CV paradigm and the marginal 
function of TNUMBID is concave which means the competition effect dominates the 
 138
winner’s curse effect, the coefficients of TNUMBID and SQTNUMBID should be 
significantly positive and significantly negative respectively and 
d(BIDPRICE)/d(TNUMBID) should show the change of sign from plus to minus. 
However, if the marginal function of TNUMBID is convex which means the winner’s 
curse effect dominates the competition effect first, then expected sign of TNUMBID 
and SQTNUMBID will be reverse. In case of the coefficient of UNCERTAIN should 
be negative and significant. However, if the underlying paradigm is PIV, then 
TNUMBID should be significantly positive with insignificant coefficient of 
SQTNUMBID or there is no change in sign of d(BIDPRICE)/d(TNUMBID)  if the 
coefficient of SQTNUMBID is significant. Also the coefficient of UNCERTAIN 
should be insignificant.  
         The hypothesized coefficients for all regressors are summarized in Table 21. 
 
TABLE 21 − Hypothesized Coefficients for Regression Analysis 
Regressor Expected estimate Rationale 
TNUMBID (PIV) + & sig. 
(CV) + & sig. or - & sig.
 
SQTNUMBID (PIV) insig. 
(CV) - & sig. or + & sig.
 
UNCERTAIN (PIV) insig. 
(CV) - & sig. 
 
INTEREST Negative  Reduce bid price when TB yield goes 
up(TB price goes down) 
TSUPPLY Negative Expect excess supply of TB in the 
market after big sale 
AUCDUM Uncertain  
BANKDUM Uncertain  
BIGDUM Uncertain   
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        First of all, I ran five regressions for each of the five dependent variables. The 
regression results are shown in Table 22. 
 
TABLE 22 − Results for Five Dependent Variable 
Dep. Var WGTBID MAXBID WINBID LOSEBID MINBID 
TNUMBID 
 
-.096* 
(.044) 
.076 
(.074) 
-.075** 
(.040) 
.301* 
(.051) 
.326* 
(.104) 
SQTNUMBID 
 
-.0005* 
(.0002) 
-.0003 
(.0004) 
-.0006* 
(.0002) 
-.001* 
(.0002) 
-.001* 
(.0006) 
UNCERTAIN 
 
1.902 
(2.146) 
9.283* 
(3.651) 
5.352* 
(1.992) 
-5.051* 
(2.107) 
-8.043** 
(4.281) 
INTEREST 
 
1.802 
(4.276) 
14.21* 
(7.182) 
5.398 
(3.918) 
-21.26* 
(4.227) 
-13.99** 
(8.587) 
TSUPPLY 
 
-.852 
(.759) 
-.193 
(1.356) 
-2.949* 
(.740) 
-3.904* 
(.717) 
-2.087 
(1.456) 
AUCDUMMY 
 
-.801* 
(.339) 
-3.246* 
(.595) 
-2.887* 
(.324) 
-.766* 
(.320) 
-.393 
(.650) 
BANKDUM. 
 
.654* 
(.244) 
.349 
(.422) 
.893* 
(.230) 
-.324 
(.234) 
-.087 
(.475) 
BIGDUMMY 
   
-.452 
(.292) 
-.901** 
(.501) 
-.589* 
(.273) 
.320 
(.265) 
-.615 
(.539) 
CONS 
 
4.492* 
(1.995) 
1.207 
(3.292) 
6.695* 
(1.796) 
-16.38* 
(2.335) 
-19.57* 
(4.745) 
R2 .034 .076 .176 .256 .074 
Obs 777 645 645 593 593 
    Std. Dev in parenthesis / * significant at the 5% level or higher / ** significant at the 10% level   
 
         To look at the coefficients of the relevant variables for the existence of CV more 
closely, I resummarize these estimates only in Table 23. 
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TABLE 23 − Summary of the Results for Concerned Variables 
Dy/dx 
 TNUMBID (B1) 
SQTNUMB 
(B2) x=38 x=76 x=111 
UNCERTAIN 
(B3) 
WGTBID -.096* .0005* -.058 -.020 .015 1.902 
MAXBID .076 -.0003 .053 .030 .009 9.283* 
WINBID -.075** .0006 -.029 -.016 .058 5.352* 
LOSEBID .301* -.0011* .217 .133 .056 -5.051* 
MINBID .326* -.0013* .227 .128 .037 -8.043** 
Expected 
(CV)  
+ & sig. 
(- & sig.) 
- & sig. 
(+ & sig.) 
+ to – (or – to +)  - & sig. 
Expected 
(PIV) 
+ & sig insig. + for all supports insig. 
* significant at 5% level,  dy/dx =B1+2*B2*x, where  x=TNUMBID, y=BIDPRICE 
 
1) Regression of WGTBID 
 
         The estimates of the coefficients of TNUMBID and SQTNUMBID are negative 
and positive respectively, and both are significant. The coefficient of TNUMBID, -
.096, is interpreted that the bid price decrease by around 0.1 basis point due to the 
increase of 1 bid point. That implies that there may be a convex relationship between 
the bid price and the number of bids. This convex type is validated by the change in 
dy/dx along the support of TNUMBID from minus to plus slope. This may imply that 
as the number of bidders increases the winner’s curse effect outweighs the competition 
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effect the first time but gradually the competition effect grows and outweighs the 
winner’s curse effect eventually. This result supports the pure CV paradigm. 
         However, the coefficient of UNCERTAIN is 1.9 which means that there is 2 
basis points increase in bid price due to one standard deviation increase in the resale 
market rates. Since the mean of UNCERTAIN is 0.09, overall response of bid price to 
UNCERTAIN is 0.2 bp which corresponds to 0.002%p. Thus, although the sign of that 
is different from what we expected, but the amount tells us that the bidder is not very 
sensitive to the volatility in the resale market rates. Statistical significance also shows 
this to be insignificant. Furthermore, the coefficient of INTEREST is insignificant so 
that my conjecture may be confirmed once again. These findings support the PIV 
paradigm. 
         Therefore, the result is inconclusive regarding whether underlying value structure 
is governed by pure CV or pure PIV. 
  
2) Regression of MAXBID and WINBID 
 
         If my hypothesis that relatively higher bid prices may follow PIV characteristics, 
then the coefficient of TNUMBID should be significantly positive but those of 
SQTNUMBID and UNCERTAIN should not be significant.  
         In the case of the behavior of bid prices with respect to the number of bids, the 
result of regression with MAXBID shows a clue to support PIV because the coefficient 
of SQTNUMBID is not significant and the slope of that is positive over the whole 
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support of TNUMBID. However, the result of the regression with WINBID is similar 
to that of the regression with WGTBID though the coefficient of QTNUMBID is not 
significant. 
         The coefficients of UNCERTAIN have somewhat unusual values which are 
significantly positive in both regressions. Also, the coefficients of INTEREST have 
positive estimates which are different from the theoretical prediction. These results 
support neither PIV nor CV. It is very hard to find a reasonable explanation for these 
results but there might be some noise which cannot be captured by the researcher.    
         Therefore, the results are not quite obvious but they seem to support PIV weakly. 
 
3) Regression of LOSEBID and MINBID 
 
         Both results give us relatively strong suggestion for CV. Since the coefficients of 
TNUMBID are significantly positive and those of SQTNUMBID are significantly 
positive the relationship shows a kind of a concave shape though the slope doesn’t 
change to negative clearly at the end point of TNUMBID support. Also, the 
coefficients of UNCERTAIN and INTEREST shows the behaviors which are predicted 
in pure CV paradigm. 
         Therefore, my hypothesis that relatively lower bid prices are likely to have strong 
CV characteristics is validated. 
 
4) Interpretation of other regressors 
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         TSUPPLY : Every regressions yields negative coefficients though the level of 
significance varies across the regressions. This result validates my conjecture that 
when the supply is relatively big, bidders tend to participate in the auction more 
conservatively with the expectation of an excess supply in the TB market. 
         AUCDUMMY : Most of the regressions report significantly negative numbers 
which means that the bid prices in the single price auction are about 0.8 basis point 
higher than those in the multiple price auction on average. 
         BANKDUMMY : In case of the weighted average bid price, the maximum bid, 
and the weighted average winning bids, banks submit higher bid prices than security 
firms. However, in case of lower bid prices, security firms are likely to submit higher 
bids than banks.  
         BIGDUMMY : In most ranges of bid prices except for the weighted average of 
loosing bids, the big bidders submit relatively lower bid prices than small bidders. This 
result suggests that big bidders might have higher capability in aggregating various 
information and forecasting the market clearing price so that they seldom submit quite 
high bid prices to win.  
 
5) Conclusion 
 
        The overall results do not seem to be enough to make a conclusive decision 
between pure PIV and pure CV. However, the regressions with decomposed data set of 
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bid points supports my hypothesis that PIV appears strongly in higher bid prices 
whereas CV in lower bid prices.  
        Since in any case we couldn’t reject the possibility of the existence of the CV 
component, these findings suggest that we need to develop a more general model 
which can encompass various types of the value structure such as interdependent value 
structure having both PIV and CV components. As I mentioned before, the benchmark 
model for this applicable both theoretically and empirically has not been developed yet, 
so I want this to remain for future research.    
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
         In this dissertation, I empirically evaluated the performance of the two 
representative auction mechanisms, the multiple price auction vs. the single price 
auction used to sell the Treasury bonds. Though this topic has been dealt with by many 
researchers for over 40 years, general conclusions have not been made yet due to the 
strategically very complex settings of divisible or multi-unit good auctions.  
         In order to make my research contributable to the academic efforts which have 
been devoted up to now, I have clarified the formula of the optimal bidding condition 
in the single price auction. Although the analytical characterization of strategic 
equilibria for the single price auction was given by Wilson(1979), Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Kahn(1998b) and Ausubel and Crampton(2002), their conditions were 
derived under the assumption of perfectly divisible price-quantity choice set or under 
the case of two units for sale. However, I have derived it under the discrete strategy 
space which restricts the prices to lie on a discrete grid reflecting the real institutional 
setting of the Treasury auction. Furthermore, since this condition is entirely expressed 
by the observed bid points it is also well applicable to the structural model estimation 
of the unknown true valuation.74   
                                                 
         74 In the case of the multiple price auction, I used the formula derived by Hortaçsu(2002).   
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         Regarding the empirical method, I followed the resampling by bootstrap which 
Hortaçsu(2002) has developed to analyze the Turkish Treasury auction. Since the 
parametric estimation of the structural model for multi-unit auctions is extremely hard 
to be implemented, his method is very helpful to avoid the risk to rely on many 
uncertain distributional assumptions and the enormous computational burden. 
However, to apply this method to the single price auction as well, I had to estimate the 
derivatives of the distribution of the market clearing price. I have developed the 
estimation techniques for those and extended the applicability of his resampling 
method. In addition, to compare the efficiency in both auction formats, I suggested the 
reasonable and estimable indicators.     
         The main findings of this paper contribute to theoretical and practical debates 
surrounding the choice of auction format. Firstly, I found that the multiple price 
auction yielded more revenue than the single price auction in Korea. This result 
suggests that the conventional belief that the single price auction may raise more 
auction revenue than the multiple price auction is not always true. Thus, policy makers 
who are considering change in the auction format should be careful of “the fallacy of 
imperfect analogy” conceptualized by Ausubel and Crampton(2002).  Secondly, the 
counterfactual Vickery auction revenues were less than actual revenues from every 
multiple price auction in my sample. As Maskin and Riley (1989), and Ausubel and 
Crampton (2002) point out, the optimal selling mechanism to maximize the revenue 
does not result in an efficient assignment in case of the multi-unit auction with 
downward-sloping demand curves. This implies that inefficient mechanisms may yield 
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more revenue to the Treasury. Since the Vickery auction yields efficient outcome, my 
findings support their predictions. Thirdly, in the efficiency ranking, my empirical 
results suggest that the single price auction may produce more inefficiency. This 
finding empirically supports the recent theoretical prediction that the single price 
auction may be less efficient than the multiple price auction because of the differential 
bid reduction behavior. Finally, we found some evidence that assuming the continuity 
in choice set regardless of the real environment of discreteness might yield different 
results from explicitly taking this discreteness into consideration. Especially, in the 
multiple price auction, we obtained somewhat different estimates of the true valuations 
and revenue losses between from the continuous version of FOCs and from the discrete 
version of FOCs.     
         However this paper suggests avenues for future research. This paper has not 
formally considered the possibility that changing the auction mechanism may affect 
bidders’ participation decisions. Market participants in the Korean auction market 
claim that the single price auction might induce more participation due to less bid 
preparation costs. Though I utilize this implication in testing the existence of a CV 
component, I assumed the number of bidders to be fixed and known to every bidder for 
my analysis. Therefore, for a more complete comparison of the two mechanisms, it 
may be worthwhile to consider the effect of endogenous bidder participation. As I 
pointed out in the discussion of the robustness problem, the assumption of PIV may 
not be the case in the Korean Treasury auction. The broader consideration of the value 
structure including the affiliated value paradigm may strengthen the validity of the 
 148
analysis. However, when the bidders’ values or signals about the values are correlated 
so that the i.i.d assumption is broken down, the nonparametric resampling method is 
not feasible. Therefore without the development of empirical methods applicable to 
more general divisible good auctions it is unclear how to deal with the general value 
structures. Lastly, more careful investigation into the bidders’ risk attitude may suggest 
possible extensions of the current model. In the single unit auction setting, many 
attempts to explain the effect of risk attitudes have been attempted,75 but explicit 
consideration has not been modeled in the multi-unit auction setting. These issues are 
fruitful for future research.  
 
                                                 
         75 Holt(80) found that when the bidders are risk averse, the revenue equivalence does not hold. 
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